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This study looks at land use allocation and wetland management on an agricultural landscape in 
the Canada’s Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) within the context of social, ecological and economic 
factors.  Policy considerations for the conservation of wetlands on an agricultural landscape are 
examined with a focus on financial incentive-based policy tools.  Empirical research looks at the 
influences on wetland management and the potential for economic incentives in wetland policy.  
In addition, a spatial approach was employed to develop specific wetland conservation targeting 
scenarios for two case study farms in two distinct agricultural regions of Saskatchewan.  Each 
targeting scenario was investigated to determine the potential effect on ecological goods and 
services, particularly carbon sequestration, as well as farm income over time.  A hypothetical 
financial incentive-based wetland conservation program was developed looking at the potential 
of interplay with private carbon markets. 
 
Land productivity, which is directly related to farm profitability, was the most important factor in 
predicting farmer participation in wetland conservation voluntarily (P<0.05).  However, 
participation in the Environmental Farm Plan program, which provides financial incentives, was 
influenced by demographic factors such as age and farm size (P<0.01) while land productivity 
had no influence.  This indicates that financial incentives may encourage farmers to participate in 
wetland conservation practices that otherwise would not.  The spatial targeting scenarios 
indicated that trade-offs exist between economic and ecological optimization, the most effective 
strategies have the highest level of benefits relative to costs and will be readily adopted by 
farmers.  Results also indicate that the publicly funded portion of wetland conservation program 
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 1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview 
From society’s perspective, in general, wetlands are underprovided on agricultural landscapes in 
the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) of Saskatchewan.  This thesis investigates land use allocation, 
wetland conservation and the bio-economic and social considerations for wetland conservation 
policy in agricultural landscapes in the PPR.  There are several considerations for wetland policy 
in the PPR to achieve a high level of participation, to be cost effective and to provide net 
environmental benefits.  It is difficult for a policy to target all wetland benefits simultaneously; 
thus, it becomes important to rank benefits and focus on those that provide the greatest welfare 
improvement for the greatest number of people (Lant 1994).  With growing concern about 
climate change there has been increasing attention paid to the potential of agricultural and 
wetland soils to help mitigate climate change by restoring and maintaining carbon stores.  Thus, 
wetland conservation strategies were investigated with a focus on carbon sequestration benefits. 
 
This empirical portion of this thesis looks at the potential of economic-incentives in wetlands 
conservation policy.  It looks at wetland conservation targeting strategies to achieve both 
ecological and economic goals.  This study also investigates the role of carbon sequestration and 
storage in developing wetland conservation policy and the role of carbon-markets to assist 
publicly funded conservation initiatives.   
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 1.2. Bio-Economic Context 
Saskatchewan’s agricultural region is primarily made up of the previously glaciated area known 
as the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) or the Continental Prairie Wetland Region which 
encompasses approximately 390 000 km2 and about 5 % of Canada (Figure 1.1) (NWWG 1988).  
Wetlands historically made up 23% of the land area in the PPR but it is estimated that 50 -70% 
of the wetlands in this region have been lost or altered primarily because of agricultural practices 
(NWWG 1988, EC 1991, Wylynko1999, Huel 2000, Euliss et al. 2006).  The two major 
disturbances are: 1) mechanical disturbance of the margin (riparian area); and 2) cultivation or 
drainage of the entire wetland (NWWG 1988).  The continuing decline of wetlands can be 
explained as a market failure attributed to 1) the public nature of the goods and services provided 
by wetlands, 2) externalities imposed on stakeholders and 3) inconsistent policies regulating the 







Figure 1.1 Canada’s Prairie Pothole Region (Prairie Ecozone) (adapted from NWWG 1988 




From society’s perspective, in general, wetlands are under-provided on agricultural landscapes in 
the PPR so the purpose of this study is to investigate policy tools, namely economic incentives, 
to conserve and enhance wetlands ecosystems on the landscape.  It also investigates 
characteristics that influence how wetlands are managed on the landscape and the validity of 
using economic incentives to encourage farmers to incorporate environmentally beneficial 
management practices on their farms. Publicly funded conservation programs are quite costly so 
it is important to consider the role of private markets in meeting conservation objectives.   
 
1.4. Objectives 
To address the problem of wetland allocation on agricultural landscapes in the PPR the following 
objectives are investigated.  First, a survey was conducted to investigate the opinions and 
attitudes of farmers that may influence the way they currently manage wetlands on their farm.  
Survey data are also used to determine the influences on farmers’ willingness to participate in 
conservation-based programs when financial incentives are present.  The second objective uses a 
spatial approach to develop management scenarios for two case study farms to determine how 
specific changes in management can affect carbon sequestration as well as farm income over 
time.  The final objective is to investigate the potential for financial incentives in wetland 
conservation policy.  In particular, it looks at the potential for interplay between carbon markets 
and conservation program payments to achieve conservation objectives.   
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 1.5. Rationale 
Employing an interdisciplinary approach is useful in studying complex bio-economic systems to 
achieve a better understanding of how these systems function.  An essential role of economic 
research is to inform policy makers of strategies that result in an efficient allocation of resources.  
However, the complexity of bio-economic systems makes it unlikely that an efficient allocation 
of resources can be accomplished.  This is particularly the case with ecological goods and 
services where the values are often not represented by market prices (Lant et al. 2000).   
 
Ecological research is useful in identifying essential levels of ecosystem function for important 
ecological goods and services to be provided by that ecosystem but does a poor job of capturing 
the trade-offs between social benefits and private costs.  In market-based economic research, 
economists strive for the most efficient allocation of resources, known as a Pareto optimal 
allocation.  In bio-economic research it is unlikely that a truly efficient allocation of resources 
can occur from both an economic and bio-physical perspective due to the non-market benefits of 
environmental goods and services.  Therefore, policy recommendations are not focused on 
maximizing economic efficiency or environmental benefits but rather on identifying an improved 
allocation of resources.  This is known as Pareto improvement criterion, that is, the winners win 
(e.g. social environmental benefits) more than the losers lose (e.g. private economic costs) and 
there is a net gain in social welfare or benefits.  This idea can be expanded to include the 
provision that the winners compensate the losers so that all stakeholders either maintain or 
improve their current level of welfare or utility (Champ et al. 2003). 
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 In terms of wetland policy in the PPR, it is essential to account for the role of wetlands in 
providing public benefits (e.g. ecological goods and services) and the private costs imposed on 
farmers for providing these ecosystems. Implementing publicly funded incentives for farmers to 
manage for healthy wetland ecosystems may lead to improved wetland management and agri-
environmental sustainability.   
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the considerations given to wetland policy development 
through a review of the relevant literature.  Chapter 3 looks at characteristics of farmers that may 
influence their participation in environmental management.  Chapter 3 also looks at wetland 
conservation targeting strategies and provides an investigation of the role of financial incentives 
such as carbon-based payments and conservation program payments as policy tools to encourage 
the restoration and maintenance of wetlands on privately owned agricultural land.  Chapter 4 
provides a synthesis and conclusions to the thesis and provides suggestions for future research. 
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 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW – CONSIDERATIONS FOR WETLAND POLICY 
Many new environmental policies that are being developed incorporate the principle of 
sustainability where the objective is not to achieve an optimal allocation but rather an improved 
allocation (Pareto improvement) (Lant et al. 2005).  With limited available public funds, the 
objective of bio-economic studies for policy development is to determine the least-cost approach 
to conservation goals (Lant 1994 and Yang et al. 2005).  This chapter looks at policy 
considerations and options for restoring riparian vegetation and maintaining existing wetlands on 
agricultural fields in Saskatchewan’s PPR.   
 
2.1. Influences on Wetland Allocation in Agricultural Landscapes 
The allocation of wetlands in agricultural landscapes in the PPR is influenced by a variety of 
social, institutional and economic factors.  The continuing loss and degradation of wetlands is 
often explained in economic terms as a market failure attributed to 1) the public nature of the 
goods and services provided by wetlands, 2) externalities imposed on stakeholders and 3) 
inconsistent policies regulating the management of wetlands (Danielson and Leitch 1986, Lant 
1994, Heimlich et al. 1998, Turner et al. 2000).  
 
The non-market, public goods and services derived from healthy wetland ecosystems are not 
considered in the decision making process because the benefits are external to the farm 
managers.  The result is conversion of wetlands to valuable alternative uses (e.g. agriculture 
production) and wetland allocation on the landscape that deviates from the social optimum for 
the ecological goods and services provided by wetlands (Danielson and Leitch 1986).  
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 Past and current institutions have played a large role in the destruction of wetland ecosystems by 
implementing agricultural policies that directly and indirectly promote the drainage and 
cultivation of wetlands to maximize production (Percy 1993, Heimlich et al. 1998, Huel 2000).  
For example, wetlands are classified as wasteland in Canada’s agricultural land inventory 
system.  Wetlands are also viewed as a hindrance to mechanized agriculture and as farm 
implements continue to expand in size it becomes more difficult to manoeuvre around wetlands 
on the landscape.  As a result of the demand for maximized agricultural production and increases 
in farm machinery power and size, farmers have been encouraged and enabled to cultivate areas 
that were previously unsurpassable (Huel, 2000). 
 
Ultimately the market failure associated with wetland allocation on agricultural landscapes 
suggests government intervention is needed.  The role of extension and education are important 
but have had a minimal impact on how wetlands are actually managed when they are used as the 
sole policy tool (Weersink 1997, Claassen et al. 2001, Benedickson 2002).  Alternatively, the use 
of strict regulation has been avoided due to issues with property rights and the costs associated 
with compliance and enforcement (Weersink 1997, Claassen et al. 2001).  The use of financial 
incentives as a policy tool is a realistic option to help farmers recognize the full value of 
wetlands and provide the quantity and/or quality of wetland ecological goods and services at the 
social optimum (Danielson & Leitch 1986, Weersink 1997, Turner et al. 2000, Claassen et al. 
2001, Lant et al. 2005).  The types of government intervention are outlined in greater detail in 
section 2.3. First, it is important to understand the current state of wetland policy and legislation 
that will influence the development of wetland policy in the future, which is the topic of 
discussion in the next section. 
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 2.2. Current State of Wetland Policy & Legislation 
There needs to be a clear understanding of current policies and legislation to understand both the 
strengths and weaknesses that will guide and limit recommendations for wetland policy in the 
PPR.  Canada was one of the first countries to develop a federal wetland policy framework in 
1991 but little progress has been made since that time. One of the mandates of the The Federal 
Policy on Wetland Conservation (FPWC) is to achieve zero net-loss of wetlands on federal land 
and land managed by federal organizations but few provisions have been made to ensure this 
goal is achieved on privately-owned land.  As the FPWC has made almost no provisions for 
private land and the majority of the PPR is private farm land, the influence of this policy on 
wetland conservation across the landscape is greatly limited. 
 
The demand for action by various levels of government to protect wetlands has been met with 
limited success.  There has been coordination amongst stakeholder groups to advance wetland 
conservation which has led to a range of policies, legislation and programs across Canada but 
there is still a long way to go in developing a comprehensive and effective wetland policy 
(Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999). Although traditionally Canadian policies have favoured a regulatory 
approach, the majority of wetland and environmental policies developed in the last two decades 
have taken a very different approach.  These policies have focused on voluntary stewardship of 
private lands through conservation programs and extension; forming conservation partnerships; 
providing exemplary management on crown lands; regional policy frameworks; and continued 
research (Lynch Stewart et al. 1999, Benidickson 2002).   
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 The provinces have jurisdiction over natural resources within their borders including wetlands, 
while the federal government only has direct authority over cross-boundary resources such as 
water, wildlife and federally owned lands (Pearse 1988, Percy 1993, Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999).  
The federal government also has concurrent authority with the provinces over agriculture which 
allows some involvement in wetland issues.  However; in the past this power was limited to 
goals associated with agriculture production and the interprovincial sale and transport of 
agricultural goods.  As wetlands were regarded as a nuisance to agriculture, common law and 
legislation fostered the removal of wetlands from the landscape (Percy 1993).  The federal 
government also has the responsibility to maintain environmental quality and migratory bird 
populations under international agreements. In any case, the use of international treaties is 
usually limited to recommendations and bears no strict legal consequence (Benedickson 2002).   
 
Although there are several statutes that apply to wetland conservation across various 
jurisdictions, there is not a comprehensive statute in any Canadian jurisdiction dedicated 
exclusively to wetlands (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999).  There are issues of duplication between 
levels of government and within the various government departments which has exacerbated the 
problem of regulating wetland management (Shutzman 2007).  
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 2.2.1. Federal Policy and Statutes 
Canada’s agreements under international treaties initiated the development of wetland policy and 
regulation in Canada.  In 1981 the government of Canada signed on to the Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands.  This is an international treaty to conserve wetlands of international importance by 
encouraging the “wise use” of wetlands.  The North American Waterfowl Management Plan 
(1986) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) are also international agreements that 
encourage wetland conservation for maintenance of wildlife habitat and biodiversity (Lynch-
Stewart et al. 1999).  These international agreements led to the development and implementation 
of The Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation in 1991.   
 
The Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (FPWC) is a federal policy that directs all 
departmental agencies to promote wetland conservation in their policies and programs.  It is 
meant to complement other international and federal policies regarding wildlife, fisheries and 
oceans, forestry and agriculture.  The objective of FPWC is to “promote the conservation of 
Canada's wetlands to sustain their ecological and socio-economic functions, now and in the 
future”.  Perhaps the most important objective of the FPWC is no-net loss of wetlands.  Canada 
has also developed Canada’s Wetland Mitigation Project, a response to FPWC.  This project has 
a hierarchical planning process; the primary goal is disturbance avoidance and outright 
protection of wetlands.  Where full protection is not feasible, the second goal is to minimize 
ecosystem impacts where development activities have occurred or are occurring.  The final goal 
is the restoration or rehabilitation of previously degraded sites (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999, Cox 
and Grose 2000).  
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 Lynch-Stewart et al. (1999) identified two common misconceptions about the FPWC that hinder 
its full and proper implementation.  The first misconception is that many people recognize the 
FPWC as being an Environment Canada policy. However, all federal departments are 
responsible for its implementation and financing.  The second is that it is viewed to apply only to 
federally managed lands.  In fact, it is meant to apply to all federal programs, policies and 
expenditures, following the guidelines of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992).  
However, as was mentioned earlier, the FPWC has limited influence on privately owned lands 
and is unlikely to have a significant impact on wetland conservation across the landscape. 
 
There are a handful of federal statutes that contribute to the wetland conservation effort.  The 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992) (CEAA) is probably the most powerful federal 
statute in terms of wetland conservation across Canada.  It sets out the procedures involved in 
environmental assessments related to projects involving the federal government.  This includes 
projects where the government is selling, leasing or transferring control of land; providing 
funding or assistance to a project; or where it exercises permitting authority (Lynch-Stewart et 
al. 1999). This statute requires that environmental effects are considered in the early stages and 
throughout the duration of all development projects.  Unfortunately, this statute does little to 
protect isolated wetlands on private agricultural fields in the PPR.  One instance where this act 
may apply is if farmers applied for federal funding to drain wetlands on agricultural land.  For 
example, loans obtained from Farm Credit Canada for farm development projects would fall 
under the umbrella of the CEAA.  It is important to note that the courts have narrowly construed 
the meaning of a “development” for purpose of the CEAA, thus many activities are not 
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 considered development and as a result not subject to an environmental assessment.  Therefore, 
the ability of the CEAA to contribute to wetland conservation is minimal. 
 
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 can be used to protect water resources but its 
focus is on pollution issues rather than habitat preservation.  The main goal of CEPA 1999 is to 
protect the environment and human health by managing and preventing risks associated with 
toxic or harmful substances.  Therefore, the Act can prevent degradation of wetlands from 
pollution but has no authority to regulate the outright protection of wetlands. Furthermore, as 
most pothole wetlands are isolated and do not contribute to a larger watershed, pollution of a 
single wetland will not pose a serious threat to public health or the environment and is therefore 
not a concern under the Act.   
 
It is also unlikely that inspection, let alone enforcement, would occur on wetlands found entirely 
within a single owner’s private property for a few reasons. First, there is a strong will not to 
interfere with resources found entirely within a single owner’s private property, which is the case 
for many wetlands (SWA 2006).  Second, the large number of wetlands in the PPR 
(approximately 4 million according to NWWG (1988)) makes monitoring and enforcement of 
the Act highly difficult for every wetland.  Finally, most wetlands in Saskatchewan’s PPR are 
relatively small in size, with 37-63% of wetlands less than 0.2 ha in size and few exceeding 10 
ha (NWWG 1988), the overall environmental and health impacts of the degradation of a single 
wetland are minimal.  Unfortunately, environmental legislation across Canada considers only 
single projects or ecosystems (e.g. a single wetland) at a time therefore the cumulative impacts of 
 12
 wetland degradation are not addressed by CEPA, 1999 or other environmental legislation for that 
matter (Shutzman 2007).   
 
Federal statutes that protect wildlife and wildlife habitat have the potential to protect wetland 
ecosystems but in reality these statutes do little to protect wetlands in the PPR.  The Migratory 
Birds Convention Act is meant to protect wildlife habitat but its only strict regulation in regards 
to wetlands is the prohibition of depositing harmful substances into wetlands important to 
migratory birds (Percy 1993 and Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999).  The application and enforcement 
of this Act on isolated wetlands on private farm land is highly infeasible for the same reasons 
outlined for CEPA 1999.      
 
 The Canada Wildlife Act enables the department of the environment to undertake conservation 
programs and research in partnership with other governments and organizations.  It also enables 
the establishment of “National Wildlife Areas” and “Marine Wildlife Areas” to protect areas of 
ecological significance.  The Act prohibits human activities that are harmful to wildlife and to the 
environment which can result in fines up to $250,000 and/or the cost of remediation.  There are 
more than 287, 000 ha of wildlife habitat protected by the Act with wetland covering about 40% 
of the area but this Act does not affect private lands (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999). Therefore, the 
wetlands of concern in this study are not subject to protection under the Act. 
 
The Fisheries Act specifies the authority of the government to regulate both inland and oceanic 
fisheries.  There are a wide range of penalties for damaging fish habitat.  This is a potentially 
powerful tool for wetland protection providing the wetlands provide habitat for fish that are 
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 important to a fisheries industry; however, few wetlands in the PPR would fall under this 
category (Percy 1993).   
 
Under the Species at Risk Act (2003) it is prohibited to “kill, harm, harass, capture, or take an 
individual of a species listed in Schedule 1 of SARA as endangered, threatened or extirpated” 
and it is an offense to damage the habitat or residence of listed species.  On privately owned farm 
land the Act only applies to aquatic species and migratory birds.  Although this is a potentially 
powerful tool for wetland protection where species at risk occur, it is largely the responsibility of 
the land owner to report species at risk as it is unlikely that federal officials would be able to 
detect these species without cooperation of the landowner. 
 
Perhaps the policy with the most potential for wetland conservation in the PPR at the federal 
level does not come from statutes but from the new Agriculture Policy Framework (APF) 
(AAFC 2008).  Although there are no regulations under the APF, the incentive structure may be 
used to encourage farmers to manage for healthy wetland ecosystems on their agricultural land.  
The APF is made up of five complementary elements: business risk management; food safety 
and quality; science and innovation; environment; and renewal.  Farmers that conduct an 
environmental farm plan (EFP) are eligible for government funding when they implement 
beneficial management practices on their farms.  Under the environmental element, wetlands are 
recognized as being an important ecosystem component and wetland restoration and riparian 
management are listed as beneficial management practices. 
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 Even though the APF recognizes the importance of managing for ecosystem health on 
agricultural lands, the overall goal is still to maximize production.  For example, major farm 
income subsidy programs such as the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization Program 
(CAIS) are still based on crop acreage and yield as opposed to the provision of environmental 
goods and services.  Furthermore, the policy provisions that address environmental management 
are focused on ecosystem restoration rather than protection (Lovell and Sullivan 2006). It can 
take 8-50 years for restored wetlands to provide the same functions as a natural wetland, so 
although restoration is important, it is obvious that more attention needs to be put on the 
preservation of wetlands that still exist as they can provide more benefits to society in both the 
short and long terms (Gutrich and Hitzhusen 2004, Lovell and Sullivan 2006). 
 
2.2.2. Saskatchewan’s Provincial Policy and Statutes  
In general, the current policies and statutes of Saskatchewan recognize the importance of healthy 
ecosystems including wetlands but they do very little in terms of regulation and protection.  In 
addition, the residual effects of early policy and legislation that encouraged the destruction of 
wetlands for agriculture production, in particular the Northwest Irrigation Act 1894 and the 
Dominion Lands Act (1872), are still apparent in how wetlands are actually managed today 
(Percy 1993).  The wording of existing statutes that could possibly be used to protect wetlands is 
often vague and open to interpretation; it is unlikely that wetland protection claims under these 
current provincial statutes would stand up in court (Bowden 2007).  The statutes tend to focus 
more on partnerships, and research and education.  While these are important elements, they are 
insufficient in protecting wetlands. 
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 Following the federal government’s example, the Saskatchewan Wetland Policy was adopted in 
1995 to recognize the importance of wetland conservation in Saskatchewan. This policy was 
followed by the Water Management Framework in 1999 which listed water management 
strategies that have now been incorporated into the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, 
2005.  The protection of wetlands through the Saskatchewan Wetland Policy is focused on 
agricultural regions as the wetlands in these regions are most threatened. The objectives of the 
Policy are: 
 
• “To encourage sustainable management of wetlands on public and private lands 
to maintain their functions and benefits. 
• To conserve wetlands that are essential to maintain critical wetland species or 
wetland functions. 
• To restore or rehabilitate degraded wetland ecosystems where previous 
destruction or alteration has resulted in a significant loss of wetland functions 
or benefits.” 
 
Two important aspects of the Saskatchewan Wetland Policy are the acknowledgement of private 
landowner and aboriginal rights and it encourages an integrated approach to wetland 
conservation by focusing on partnerships with governments, industry, conservation organizations 
and individuals (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999 and Annand et al. 2002). However, the Policy lacks, 
arguably, the most important mandate for wetland protection which is no net-loss, and ignores 
the most threatened wetland ecosystems which are seasonal wetlands on agricultural lands.  The 
definition of wetlands under the Saskatchewan Wetland Policy is as follows: 
 
“both the wet basin and an area of transitional lands between the waterbodies and 
adjacent upland…The transitional lands are a minimum of 10 metres (33 feet) 
adjacent to the area covered by water at the waterbody’s normal full supply level... 
low-lying areas predominantly under cultivation are not considered wetlands, as 
they have been converted to other uses.”  
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The Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, 2005 (SWA) is the central piece of regulatory 
legislation for wetlands in Saskatchewan that aims to manage and protect Saskatchewan’s water 
resources.  Wetlands are included in the Act’s definition of surface water which includes “water 
that is above the surface of land and in a river, stream, lake, creek, spring, ravine, coulee, 
canyon, lagoon, swamp, marsh or other watercourse or water body.” But, as noted in the above 
definition of wetlands, this act does not recognize seasonal wetlands on agricultural fields. 
 
Although the SWA Act, 2005 is relatively new, it has been largely deemed as inefficient in 
protecting wetland resources because the principles of the act still strongly resemble legislation 
stemming from the settlement of the prairies more than a century ago, in particular the Northwest 
Irrigation Act, 1894 (Bowden 2007).  The broad conservation mandates simply state ways in 
which wetlands may be effectively managed.  The ambiguous wording and broad statements 
used throughout the SWA Act, 2005 makes it difficult for administrators to gain direction and 
undermines any attempts to regulate under the Act (Bowden 2007).  For example, section 38 
suggests that the crown has the right to manage and regulate all wetland resources but further 
investigation of the Act reveals that SWA can delegate water rights at its broad discretion.  As 
another example, wetland drainage works require approval from SWA but the approval of a 
drainage project does not apply to drainage projects on private land where the drained water does 
not leave the owners land.  This essentially deems the regulation useless as many drainage 
projects only affect the owners land.  For example, many wetland drainage projects will divert 
water into one large wetland or into a creek or river that intersects the owners land.  It is rarely 
an issue for drainage projects to affect other land owners. However, when drainage projects do 
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 affect other land owners the legal issue is not wetland protection but flooding of another farmer’s 
land, thus reducing the agricultural capability of the neighbouring land.  
 
The Conservation Easements Act is identified in the Saskatchewan Wetlands Policy as an 
important tool for conservation.  Conservation easements allow landowners to place a voluntary 
easement on their property to protect ecological goods and services that is protected by law and 
transfers with title. Conservation easements are highly varied in the ecosystems they protect and 
the management practices that can still occur on the land.  They range from strict land retirement 
to allowing some development or agricultural practices that do not compromise the integrity of 
the ecosystem of concern.  However, because conservation easements exist on relatively small 
tracts of land they do not contribute significantly to the overall conservation effort.  Also since 
they are voluntary, there is no guarantee that those areas in the greatest need of protection will 
ever benefit from conservation easements. 
 
Other provincial legislation that applies to wetland management includes Saskatchewan’s 
Environmental Assessment Act which has similar objectives and enforcement measures as the 
federal act.  This Act enforces that in the planning phases of development projects the 
environmental implications be considered.  Similar to the federal act, the Saskatchewan 
Environmental Assessment Act also has limited application due to the narrow scope of activities 
considered to be development projects.  In addition, there is not a specific requirement for 
considerations to be given to wetland conservation and it is unlikely that this act would be 
applied to privately managed, agricultural lands.  Likewise, The Environmental Management and 
Protection Act, 2002 which regulates and prevents “adverse effects” to the environment, is 
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 unlikely to be applied to wetlands in agricultural fields.  This act is meant to complement the 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, 2005 in that it includes penalties for water quality 
related issues.  However, it does not have any specific provisions for wetland conservation.  
 
Provisions for wetland conservation have been made in wildlife and resource statutes such as The 
Natural Resources Act, 1993, The Wildlife Act, 1998 and The Wildlife Habitat Protection Act but 
the powers of these statutes are more enabling than mandatory and focus more on extension and 
education.  The Wildlife Act, 1998 has tools for protecting species at risk that require ecosystem 
maintenance and management for habitats of species at risk.  It is unlikely that these powers 
would be enforced on private farm lands for the protection of isolated wetlands.  Most of the 
powers in these statutes are reserved for implementation on crown lands.  
 
As this discussion indicates, while wetland conservation policy exists at both the provincial and 
federal level the policy tools currently used to meet environmental objectives (e.g. extension, 
research, conservation easements and regulations) are inefficient in protecting wetland resources 
on their own, particularly on privately owned land.  The lag in efficient policy development can 
be costly to the environment.  The longer that policy lags, the more powerful economic 
enterprises become entrenched in our society and it becomes more difficult to regulate them 
(Pearse, 1988).  There is ever increasing tensions between resource developers and 
environmental organizations.  As society becomes used to certain practices regardless of whether 
or not they have a legal right to them, it is difficult to change or prevent these practices from 
occurring (Pearse, 1988). 
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 One of the barriers to effective wetland conservation policy on agricultural landscapes has been 
limited knowledge on how to manage for healthy wetlands and riparian areas in these landscapes 
(Lovell and Sullivan 2006).  This limited knowledge is often attributed to incomplete wetland 
surveys, difficulties identifying the areas of greatest concern, and the continued need for research 
into the best policy approach.  Furthermore, research is often funded by agribusinesses that are 
interested in maximizing profits; this has resulted in scientists favouring private economic 
interests over social interests (Blesh & Barrett 2006). However, other countries faced with 
similar problems, such as the United States and Australia, have implemented strict regulatory 
policies on wetland protection.  Perhaps the best explanation for a poorly developed wetland 
policy in Canada is the lack of political will (Farnese 2005). 
 
Difficulties in developing efficient environmental policies are also attributed to issues with 
property rights, particularly in terms of regulation on private lands.  Due to the significance of 
property rights in environmental policy the following sub-section has been dedicated to this 
issue. 
 
2.2.3. Property Rights 
The term property right refers to the bundle of rights that defines the privileges and limitations to 
the use of particular resource.  In this definition property is not an object, but rather a collection 
of entitlements (Ziff 2000, Tietenberg 2006).  In essence a property right can be thought of as a 
relationship between an object of interest (either tangible or intangible), the individual or group 
of individuals related to the object of interest and all others who are enforced to respect the right 
(Kaplowitz 2000, Ziff 2000).  The well defined property right of ownership, often referred to as 
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 private property, includes the right to possession; management and control; income and capital; 
trade and transfer; and protection under law.   
 
Property rights are a common issue when developing environmental policy whether it is in a 
legal or economic context; however, the application of the property rights differs greatly between 
the disciplines.  In economics, researchers often create or assign property right distributions that 
help explain allocation of resources.  This assignment of property rights is a useful tool for 
economists when rights are not well understood.  However, legal property rights are interpreted 
in accordance with the law. Understanding how the property rights for a particular resource are 
allocated to potential stakeholders is interpreted through a combination of provincial and federal 
legislation as well as common law.  The current understanding of property rights under the law 
guides and limits the type of policy that can be developed (Percy 1993).  
 
Property rights for environmental goods define the rate of use and ultimately stewardship 
objectives.  The composition of property rights and the distribution of rights among stakeholders 
will affect the incentive scheme needed to achieve conservation objectives (Allan 2005).  
Unfortunately, in the case of the environment it is rare to have well defined, individual property 
rights.  Poorly defined individual property rights leads to the presence of externalities, public 
goods and common property resources (Kaplowitz 2000). Thus, the problems associated with 




 Problems with undefined individual rights to property often arise when there is a sudden change 
in value of a resource often due to real or perceived scarcity. This can occur when there is a 
change in social beliefs regarding the value of a particular resource, for example the public 
recognition of benefits associated with healthy wetland ecosystems.  Prior to the change in value, 
there is little need to understand the property rights associated with a resource; however when 
the change in value is recognized, it becomes essential to determine who is entitled to benefit or 
alternatively who carries the burden of the resource. The development of policies generally 
follow changes in social beliefs but this lag to policy development can be costly to the 
environment (Pearse 1988).  According to Pearse (1988), the longer that policy lags, the more 
powerful economic enterprises become entrenched in our society making it more difficult to 
regulate these enterprises.  In the past, land use policy in the PPR has tended to favour drainage 
and cultivation of wetlands because the social values of wetlands were not recognized.  Thus, 
even though society now recognizes the value of wetlands, it is extremely difficult to develop 
policies that protect society’s perceived environmental rights as these rights conflict with deep 
rooted traditions (Pearse 1988). 
 
One of the major issues with developing environmental policies is identified by Kaplowitz 
(2000) as presumptive property rights; opposing groups presume they have a right which leads to 
conflict over the management of the resource.  In some cases the property rights have already 
been assigned, there is simply a misunderstanding or ambiguity as to how they can be regulated.   
For example, wildlife is crown property, however the right to regulate wildlife found on privately 
owned land is not well defined or understood.  In most cases the property rights have not been 
clearly defined and conflicts are a matter for the courts.  In the case of wetlands in a private 
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 property scenario there are generally two views: 1) private landowners claim that they hold the 
right to do as they wish with the resources on their land and 2) the public has a right to 
environmental amenities derived from resources on private land and management decisions 
should be made in the context of socially acceptable behaviours.  The conflict between opposing 
views is exacerbated by ambiguity in current statutes.  For example, neither environmental nor 
property rights are clearly protected by Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but this does 
not mean that these rights do not exist implicitly in other constitutional provisions (Benedickson 
2002).  For example, section 7 of the Charter states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in the principles of 
fundamental justice”.  This can be interpreted that society implicitly has environmental rights as 
they are to be free of threats to life and health which can include environmental degradation.  
Alternatively, it can be interpreted that those who derive livelihood off of the land should be 
protected, suggesting individual property rights exist. This ambiguity regarding rights makes 
regulation of wetland management in a statutory framework very difficult. The provincial 
governments have the authority to impose strict regulations on wetlands found on private 
property, however this is not an optimal or a desirable solution within the current interpretation 
of individual private property rights by both the landowners themselves and society.  This has 
largely been influenced by past institutions that favoured individual property rights even though 
there was no strict legal protection of these rights.  Since environmental rights are a relatively 
recent concern they tend to have less support from individuals and society than individual 
property rights.   
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 “Public support for wetland protection is strong, but especially among 
landowners, there is also a very strong interest in protecting the landowner’s 
right to manage his or her own land and therefore, resistance to a regulated 
approach to wetland protection” (SWA 2006). 
 
An often over-looked characteristic of individual property rights are the responsibilities that 
come along with them such as prohibition from harm.  These ownership responsibilities may be 
enforced through social expectations or by law which has been the European Union’s approach 
to environmental management and conservation (Ziff 2000).  However, the nature of the EU’s 
landscape (i.e. the fact that it is densely populated) makes compliance and enforcement possible, 
such a policy would be difficult to implement in Canada where vast tracts of virtually 
uninhabited land makes compliance and enforcement highly infeasible. 
 
Property rights are always a concern when making recommendations to policy makers.  In the 
case of environmental goods and services, Mitsch and Gosselink (2000) and Olewiler (2004) 
argue that representing governments have the right to protect public goods and it is their 
responsibility to work with private landowners to achieve environmental objectives.  However, 
the right to regulate for environmental benefits on privately owned land is not implicit in current 
statutes.  Fortunately, regulation is not the only means to meet environmental objectives and 
understanding that individuals respond to incentives provides governments with an array of tools 
to meet environmental objectives while respecting the current interpretation of private and public 
property rights.  
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 2.3. Approaches to Sustainable Wetland Policy Development 
It is important that policies are economically and environmentally sustainable.  Thus, the World 
Commission on Environment & Development (1987) recommended that environmental and 
economic considerations be integrated in decision making. Good policies are those that target 
funding to the areas where benefits are greatest relative to costs, allow producers the flexibility to 
meet environmental objectives and involve program co-ordination to avoid duplication and to 
offset costs of each other (Claassen et al. 2001).   
 
An agri-landscape wetland policy refers to the group of programs and policy tools that can be 
used to encourage farmers to participate in management of wetlands for environmental benefits.  
In the past, agri-environmental policies focused on pollution prevention; this focus gradually 
shifted to the protection of specific environmental benefits that also provided private benefits to 
landowners (e.g. soil conservation).  The latest shift in environmental policy is to broaden the 
definition of environmental protection to ecosystem and landscape protection to ensure the 
provision of all ecological goods and services as opposed to targeting a single benefit (Claassen 
et al. 2001, Benedickson 2002).  While conceptually the ecosystem approach has taken hold in 
society and with policy makers there is yet to be legislation passed that truly reflects the 
ecosystem approach.   
 
A variety of policy tools can be used to meet wetland conservation objectives ranging from 
voluntary to mandatory.  There are four categories of policy instruments commonly used to meet 
environmental objectives: 1) research & extension 2) spending and investment 3) economic 
incentives and 4) regulation.  Regardless of the policy tools utilized, several considerations must 
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 be taken into account when developing wetland and environmental policy as outlined by 
Benidickson (2005) and DeMarco (2007). 
 
1. Environmental & Property Rights – The public’s environmental rights need to be 
formalized in legislation so that they are given the proper weighting in economic decisions. 
Meanwhile the property rights of farmers also need to be respected and weighted 
accordingly in the decision-making process.  This is complicated by the fact that public 
environmental rights and private property rights are often in conflict.   
2. Polluter Pays Principle – This emphasizes that polluters should be responsible for the 
harmful environmental costs associated with their activities. 
3. Precautionary Principle – This states that even in the absence of scientific evidence of harm 
early preventative action is appropriate where the environmental risks of human activities 
are uncertain but potentially great.  It also acknowledges the importance of leaving wide 
margins of ecosystem tolerance to disturbance so that natural systems will be able to adapt 
to human induced changes.  Those who wish to engage in an activity with uncertain 
environmental impacts are responsible for proving that the potential impacts would be 
within a tolerable range. 
4. Intergenerational Principle & Sustainability – Consideration will be given to both the 
current and future generation’s welfare.  Enjoying gains in welfare now should not be at the 
expense of future generations and vice versa.  The principle of sustainability recognizes the 
interconnectedness of the economy and the environment; environmental goals must be met 
in ways that encourage economic prosperity.  Legislation and policy must be developed 
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 that is flexible for this continually evolving relationship between the environment and the 
economy. 
5. Public Trust – This confirms the obligation of the government to “safeguard” the 
environmental integrity of state property for the benefit of current and future generations. 
6. Inherent Value – This acknowledges the value of an ecosystem in itself, this is also known 
as a non-use or existence value.  Despite the non-market nature of these values, they should 
be given appropriate weighting in environmental decision making.    
7. Ecosystem Approach and Ecological Integrity – Ecosystems are complex, interconnected 
systems that do not act in isolation of their surroundings.  Changes to even the small 
components can have large ecosystem effects.  For example, elimination of a single species 
can lead to the collapse of the entire ecosystem.  Protecting ecological integrity 
acknowledges the importance of all components of the system to healthy functioning of the 
ecosystem.  When an ecosystem is healthy and performing all of its natural functions, the 
social benefits from that ecosystem can be maximized.  Although it is extremely difficult to 
understand the complexity of these ecosystems, management practices need to take this 
into consideration.   
8. Pollution Prevention – This coincides with the polluter pays and precautionary principles in 
that it is more cost-effective to prevent pollution than to have to take remedial action in a 
future time period. 
9. Cumulative Effects – This corresponds to the ecosystem approach.  A single small 
disturbance is not likely to harm a system but several small disturbances can have a huge 
and damaging cumulative effect.   
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 10. Access to Information (right to know) – The public has a right to know the state of the 
environment and should be made aware of any development projects that may adversely 
impact the environment.  This principle has been commonly adopted in environmental 
legislation. 
 
To reiterate and expand upon existing wetland policies, in the PPR where wetland numbers are at 
a critical level to provide important ecological goods and services and are particularly vulnerable 
to climate change (Johnson et al. 2005), policies must address the need for continued wetland 
protection to achieve no net loss of wetlands (Farnese 2005).  Wetland policy in the PPR will 
require an array of tools to meet objectives; perhaps the most important consideration in 




Regulatory policy tools are a direct mechanism that require environmental standards to be met 
regardless of the private expenses incurred. Environmental regulation can be achieved through a 
combination of statutory law, tort law and contractual law.  Statutes that can be used to protect 
the environment are found in direct environmental laws, corporate law and tax law (Benedickson 
2002).  The provisions in these statutes for environmental protection are generally focused on 
environmental pollution, usually incorporating the “polluter pays” principle (Weersink et al. 
1998).  Although there has been a shift in environmental policies toward ecosystem maintenance, 
regulatory tools still tend to be based on pollution prevention and remediation as can be seen in 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999.  In general, regulation is warranted when 
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 environmental risk is high and society’s acceptable level of tolerance for environmental 
degradation is low.  Thus, regulation is often used in the case of public health and safety 
concerns, in highly environmentally sensitive areas and where changes are irreversible as in the 
case of species extinction (Weersink 1997 and Claassen et al. 2001).  
 
In the past regulatory policy tools were largely avoided for environmental protection due to 
enforcement difficulties and issues with property rights encountered with regulatory policies 
(Claassen et al. 2001).  Regulation represents an extreme approach to environmental 
management where participation is involuntary and there is no direct financial compensation for 
compliance but non-compliance may result in fines.  As a result, regulation can be the most 
effective tool in improving environmental quality in a short period of time.  However, this type 
of program does not allow farmers the flexibility or freedom to opt out if management changes 
are too costly.  As well, past agriculture policies supported and subsidized farm income and there 
is a perceived need for this to continue which is in conflict to environmental regulation 
(Weersink et al. 1998).  Admittedly, a strictly regulatory approach to wetland protection would 
be inequitable especially in the prairie agricultural region where the vast majority of wetlands 
occur on private farm lands.  Since society reaps the benefits of environmentally beneficial 
management practices, it is often perceived by both private landowners and policy makers as 
unfair to expect farmers to bear the full burden of providing these ecological goods and services 
to society.  Therefore, in terms of wetland conservation policy, there is a need for policy that 
mandates wetland protection and provides compensation to those who produce the goods.  The 
cost of regulation on individual farmers may be alleviated through low interest loans or financial 
assistance programs (Weersink et al. 1998).  However, it is also important to consider the level 
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 of environmental protection farmers should be responsible for providing to society as it is 
recognized that ownership of land confers both rights and responsibilities to the landowner (Frey 
and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Reeson and Tisdell 2006).  The issue of landowner responsibilities to 
society is discussed in further detail under economic incentives in section 2.3.4. 
 
Regulation is not only costly for individuals forced to comply but also for taxpayers as the cost 
of establishing government standards, and then monitoring and enforcing them, are very high.  
Enforcement is particularly difficult for performance-based policy where the damages/benefits of 
an individual farmer are difficult to directly observe and monitor.  Alternatively, management-
based policy, particularly land-retirement objectives (e.g. wetland and riparian areas), is much 
easier because individual farmers and their practices can be monitored by using of satellite 
images and GIS applications (Weersink et al. 1998).  However, there is a need to consider 
political realities such as a policy maker’s main goal of re-election.  As such, they may be averse 
to implementing policies with strict regulations on private farm land unless there are land-use 
effects that negatively impact life-supporting ecosystems (Weersink et al. 1998 and Claassen et 
al. 2001).   
 
It is unlikely that regulation alone will be able to play a large role in wetland conservation in the 
PPR. When considering only an individual farm or a single wetland, the removal of isolated 
wetlands is not considered to contribute significantly to overall landscape function.  However, 
the cumulative effects of wetland loss across the landscape can have very significant and 
negative impacts on the environment.  Thus, it is important to consider options to ensure a 
minimum provided standard for wetlands on the landscape.  A minimum standard for wetland 
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 conservation may be achieved through cross-compliance programs which use a combination of 
regulation and economic incentives.  Compliance instruments require a standard level of 
compliance to be eligible to participate in other income support programs.  A good example of a 
cross-compliance program is the United States Swampbuster Program.  To achieve a mandate of 
no-net loss of wetlands, support benefits from all government funded farm programs are denied 
to farmers who plant crops in wetland areas or who drained or altered wetlands after 1985 (EPA 
2008).  Thus, the onus is placed on farmers to prove that no wetlands have been drained or 
altered for the farmer’s land to be eligible for other income support programs.     
 
Considerable technical assistance is required for cross-compliance programs and compliance 
verification and enforcement may be costly (Classen et al. 2001).  However, if the most costly 
environmental management practices are used as the criteria to be met before other programs can 
be triggered, cross-compliance programs are likely to cost less overall than other economic-
incentive programs (Weersink et al. 1998).  To achieve significant participation in cross-
compliance programs, incentive payments have to be significant and attractive to farmers 
(Claassen et al. 2001).           
 
Another regulatory mechanism is licensing controls.  Licensing controls can be used to regulate 
management practices such as wetland drainage or cultivation.  However, these types of licenses 
are avoided on private lands unless negative effects from an activity are tangible and external to 
the land owner.  For example, in the SWA Act, 2005 drainage requires a license but it is rarely 
enforced and does not apply to privately-owned lands where water does not leave the owner’s 
land.   
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 Government labelling standards can also be used to regulate for environmental management.  
Labelling standards recognize farmers for participating in beneficial environmental management 
practices by labelling consumer products so that the farmer earns a premium price (e.g. organic 
products).  Like compliance mechanisms, labelling standards combine regulation with economic 
incentives.  Although this is a voluntary program, enforcement measures, in the form of third 
party verification, are still needed for those who enrol in the certification program.  One of the 
advantages of certification program is that consumers are made aware of the beneficial 
management practices that go into production of labelled products and can make a conscious 
decision to support these types of practices.  In addition, having a national labelling standard can 
help facilitate domestic and international trade that provides direct economic benefits to the 
producer (Weersink et al. 1998 and Claassen et al. 2001).  Environmental standardized labelling 
as policy tool is only useful if gains from participation can be captured in the market (Claassen et 
al. 2001).  Although it is possible that wetland conservation policy can benefit from labelling of 
commodities produced on farms that provide wetlands, there has been no directly applicable 
research to support this approach to wetland conservation policy. 
 
Regulation can also be used as a means to establish markets (Weersink et al. 1998).  For 
example, the introduction of greenhouse gas emissions caps led to the creation of carbon 
markets. The use of carbon markets to meet environmental objectives is central part of the 
discussion in the economic incentives section 2.3.4 as well as in Chapter 3.  
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 2.3.2. Land Retirement & Investment 
Governments can take an active role in environmental protection by purchasing land for 
retirement.  This is a very costly practice and is not feasible for large tracts of land.  Furthermore, 
there may be resentment towards the government for competing against farmers to purchase land 
that is perceived to be suitable for agricultural production (Claassen et al. 2001).  The only time 
that purchase of land is warranted is for highly ecologically sensitive areas.  An alternative to 
purchasing land is to purchase conservation easements (Byrne 2005).  These are voluntary 
agreements that landowners enter into to conserve environmental resources in perpetuity.  In 
general, conservation easements apply to an entire parcel of land and dictate the type (if any) of 
management practices that can occur on that parcel of land.  Management restrictions on 
conservation easements range from complete retirement of the land to allowing certain 
development projects as long as the ecological integrity of the property is not compromised.  A 
more detailed discussion of conservation easements was provided in section 2.2.2.  The difficulty 
with the voluntary nature of conservation easements is that there is no guarantee that the land 
that needs to be protected the most will be enrolled in the program (Claassen et al. 2001). 
 
2.3.3. Extension, Research and Technological Innovation 
Extension is a policy tool to disseminate information to farmers through education and technical 
assistance which can be delivered by the government, independent consulting firms or 
conservation organizations.  Extension tools can be used to encourage wide adoption of practices 
by increasing awareness about conservation practices with farmers.  However, participation in 
extension programs is generally not mandatory and those who do participate do not necessarily 
adopt the recommended beneficial management practices (Weersink et al. 1998).  For these 
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 reasons, to be an effective tool extension services often target practices that also benefit the 
producer by lowering production costs, increasing productivity or reducing damages to resources 
that farmers use such as groundwater (Claassen et al. 2001).  Where private costs exceed 
benefits, the responsibility of environmental management falls on those who feel a moral 
responsibility, yet the farms that participate in environmental management are not necessarily the 
farms with the potential to produce greatest benefits (Weersink et al. 1998).   
 
An extension program can also be successful if it is partnered with economic incentives or 
regulations.  Education and technical assistance programs were the primary environmental 
conservation policy used throughout the majority of the 20th century but they were relatively 
ineffective in encouraging environmental management when implemented as the sole policy tool 
(Weersink et al. 1998 Claassen et al. 2001, Benedickson 2002).  Extension efforts have increased 
awareness of environmental practices but these do not guarantee that farmers will consciously 
manage for healthy wetland ecosystems. The high cost of extension programs relative to the 
level of environmental benefits they provide indicates that extension may be an insufficient tool 
on its own but may serve to support or complement economic incentive or regulatory programs.  
For any program or policy to be successful, potential participants must be made aware of both 
the benefits and costs of the policy so that they can make a rational decision to participate and/or 
choose the most effective strategy to comply.  Extension and technical assistance is critical to 
disseminate this information. 
 
Government funding can also be used to support and encourage research of environmentally 
beneficial management practices or technological innovations that reduce human impact on the 
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 environment yet maintain income stability.  An example of such an innovation was the 
development of zero-till crop production.  The need for soil conservation while maintaining farm 
income was largely responsible for this technological advancement.  Often regulation or 
incentives are needed to encourage such technological innovation (Weersink et al. 1998). 
 
Investment in technology has also resulted in large advances in satellite and GIS technologies.  
These technological advances have allowed policy-makers to cost-effectively target conservation 
programs by integrating physical, social and economic data into a user friendly framework across 
disciplines to conduct benefit-cost analysis.  The use of satellite imagery and data collection has 
greatly reduced the need for intensive field data collection to make informed policy decisions.  
For example, GIS applications have been used extensively over the last decade for wetland 
conservation research by spatially delineating the most cost-effective areas to meet 
environmental objectives.  Although the majority of these studies have focused on sediment 
abatement and pollution control (Yang et al. 2003, Yang and Weersink 2004), it is possible by 
using GIS technology to measure other ecological goods and services as well as costs associated 
with the implementation of specific beneficial management practices across a landscape to 
establish a cost-effective policy strategy.   
 
2.3.4. Economic Incentives  
Economic incentive instruments can be used to internalize the positive societal benefits that are 
otherwise external to farmers making management decisions, thus correcting inefficiencies in 
land use allocation (Weersink et al. 1998).  To correct the inefficient land use allocation from 
society’s perspective, economic incentives can either be positive and voluntary by providing 
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 farmers with payments to encourage environmentally beneficial management practices, or 
negative and involuntary by taxing farmers for environmentally harmful activities.  In general it 
is felt that farmers should be compensated for providing public goods, this is sometimes referred 
to as the provider-gets approach, so the majority of financial incentive programs provide positive 
incentives (Claassen et al. 2001 and Weersink et al. 1998).  Incentive programs are viewed as 
being more flexible than regulatory regimes because they allow farmers to weigh the costs and 
the benefits before they choose to participate in the program.  In addition, farmers are considered 
to be well informed decision-makers; therefore, they will choose the strategy that yields the most 
private benefits at the least cost, or if the costs are too great they will not adopt the program.  
This inherently selects the most cost-effective farms to adopt the program (Weersink et al. 1998).  
However, the efficiency of the program is greatly influenced by the program design and the 
payment mechanism and amount. 
 
One economic incentive design is a cost-share incentive program.  Farmers pay for the adoption 
of beneficial management practices and the cost share program may cover a portion or all of the 
costs.  This is the approach taken by Canada’s National Farm Stewardship Plan (NFSP).  When 
beneficial management practices (BMP) have been identified in farmers’ environmental farm 
plans, they can apply to the NFSP to cover up to half of their costs of implementing the BMPs 
(PCAB 2006).  If cost-share payments do not exceed the costs and there are no or limited private 
benefits, it is unlikely that farmers will participate.  However, if the payments exceed the cost 
then the program represents an income support which is costly to taxpayers (Claassen et al. 
2001).  Cost-share programs are most-effective in implementing management changes that 
maintain or improve private profitability such as management changes that still allow crop 
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 production.  For example, a cost share program that helps farmers implement zero-till should be 
widely adopted because crop production can still occur and soil productivity is often improved 
while environmental benefits such as a reduction in soil erosion and improved wildlife habitat 
are also achieved. Thus, supporting environmental management practices that support continued 
crop production on the land may be more cost-effective than land retirement options but the 
benefits are also not as great (Feng et al. 2006).  Again, using the zero-till example, the land can 
remain in production, thus, maintaining and possibly improving farm income.  However the 
benefits of erosion reduction, carbon sequestration and biodiversity are significantly lower than 
if the land was retired from production completely, as in the case of riparian restoration.  
Furthermore, economic incentive programs can actually create perverse incentives.  For example, 
if there is a subsidy for farmers to implement zero-till on their land, farmers who have previously 
practiced no-till may make an economically rational decision to cultivate the land to be eligible 
for the program payment. 
 
Economic instruments that are based on land retirement pay farmers a one-time or an annual 
payment to remove land from crop production.  In existing programs, direct payments are usually 
designed for select marginal lands or lands that are ecologically sensitive.  These programs are 
intended to compensate farmers for the opportunity cost of foregone crop production.  Canada’s 
Greencover Program is an example of such a land retirement program.  The precursor to 
Greencover was the Permanent Cover Program which focused on the retirement of marginal 
lands (classes 4, 5 and 6 under the Canada Land Inventory) which are those lands that earn the 
lowest economic returns (Vaiser et al. 1996).  The Greencover program now focuses on 
environmentally critical areas and shelter belts for enrolment in the program and farmers receive 
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 a one-time payment to convert land to permanent cover (AAFC 2007). A primary objective of 
the program is to “enhance the health and function” of riparian systems, thus riparian areas are 
defined as environmentally critical areas under Greencover program. The payment amount does 
not cover the full opportunity cost of foregone crop production because other economic 
activities, such as livestock grazing or haying, are still permitted. 
 
An additional private benefit of land retirement programs is that the total amount of area in 
production is reduced which controls supply.  If significant amounts of area are removed from 
crop production this may contribute to increases in grain prices (Claassen et al. 2001).  However, 
while higher prices are beneficial to farmers it is important to note that there will be a negative 
impact on consumers (Claassen et al. 2001). 
   
Land retirement programs are also relatively easy to monitor and enforce thereby reducing the 
transaction costs.  However, land retirement programs are still highly costly because they must 
cover the cost of production.  In general, only where environmental benefits are high should land 
retirement be implemented (Claassen et al. 2001).   
 
Other economic incentive instruments include tradable permits and environmental taxes.  
Environmental taxes are meant to be a disincentive to environmental harm by charging a per unit 
tax on practices or emissions that lead to environmental degradation (Weersink et al. 1998, 
Claassen et al. 2001).  Tradeable emissions permits (e.g. CO2 equivalents) can allow firms to 
meet their threshold standard and avoid environmental taxes by purchasing permits from 
industries that act as net sinks.  Practices on agricultural lands that sequester carbon, including 
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 wetland restoration, are widely cited to participate in the carbon trade to help stabilize farm 
incomes.  Both emissions trading permits and environmental taxes are representative of the 
polluter pays principle.   
 
An effective wetland conservation program may be one that is a combination of all of the 
economic incentive instruments discussed above.  For example, only specified wetland 
influenced areas on the field would be retired in a land retirement program allowing crop 
production on the remainder of the field.  A cost-share program can help cover the costs of 
restoration while the land-retirement can offset foregone crop production income, thereby 
encouraging wetland maintenance.  Since land retirement programs result in net carbon 
sequestration, these programs present an opportunity for interplay between private carbon permit 
trade and publicly funded conservation programs to help reduce publicly funded costs (Feng et 
al. 2004, Feng and Kling 2005). Further discussion on this issue is provided in section 2.4.2 and 
chapter 3.   
 
While incentive instruments represent useful tools to increase ecosystem goods and service 
provision on private land, it is difficult to estimate efficient monetary values for economic 
incentive-based policies.  Finding an effecient economic-incentive value is necessary to 
encourage participation and to help determine total program cost prior to implementation. In 
addition, the transaction costs of implementation and monitoring and enforcement are high and 
represent a significant proportion of the total program cost.   However, these costs are difficult to 
define a priori.  This may represent difficulties in applying for and receiving adequate program 
funding from the responsible agencies.  Miscalculation of total program costs can result in the 
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 inability of the program to enrol the desired number of participants or there may be a lack of 
technical assistance needed to achieve conservation objectives.   
 
In an agricultural context incentive-based environmental protection programs may be an 
effective replacement for programs that provide subsidies based on crop acreage and yield.  
Many income supports tied to production have been based on disaster relief.  These “ad-hoc” 
emergency programs are often highly costly and unsustainable (Claassen et al. 2001).  In 
addition, international farm trade agreements limit the future abilities of governments to provide 
production related subsidies.  For example, the World Trade Organization Uruguay Round Table 
Agreement on Agriculture implemented a farm income support ceiling on countries engaging in 
international trade.  However, these income support ceilings exempt “Green Box Payments”; that 
is payments to farmers for environmental goods and services (Claassen et al. 2001, Feng et al. 
2006).  As a result of shifting the program subsidies away from crop production to production of 
environmental goods the public is subsidizing a public good, rather than directly subsidizing 
farm income with no public return (Lant 1994, Claassen et al. 2001, Lant et al. 2005).  This 
solution is consistent with the Pareto improvement criterion in that those who benefit from 
wetland preservation would compensate those incurring costs to provide public environmental 
benefits.   
 
Policies aimed at wetland conservation can be made more effective by including tools to ensure 
the maintenance of existing wetlands, as these are the most valuable wetland ecosystems, while 
also encouraging wetland restoration to gain additional benefits (Lovell and Sullivan 2006). The 
combination of the United States Wetland Reserves Program, which provides a retirement 
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 incentive, and the Swampbuster Program, which requires that wetlands be maintained to access 
any government funding, has been very effective in meeting their wetland conservation objective 
of no-net loss of wetlands.  The results of these American programs show that it is possible to 
obtain conservation objectives if the political will exists (Heimlich et al. 1998 and Claassen et al. 
2001).  However, researchers predict that if incentive-based programs were eliminated in the 
U.S., the conversion of wetlands to alternative land uses would increase rapidly; this prediction 
highlights the importance of program continuation (Heimlich et al. 1998). 
 
A concern with economic incentives is that offering payment to provide ecological goods and 
services will detract from feelings of obligation to take care of the environment that we live in.  
It is possible that farmers have been compensated for providing public goods so often that their 
willingness to contribute voluntarily is diminishing, this is explained as “conditional 
cooperation” or “motivational crowding-out” as a result of formal economic incentive (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Byrne 2005,  Reeson and Tisdell 2006).  It may become important in 
future policies to determine whether it is too late to identify the farmer’s responsibility for 
environmental protection because of the conditional cooperation problem identified above.  If it 
is too late we may be committed to providing incentives. 
 
The discussion indicates that no single policy instrument will be effective on its own.  In terms of 
wetland policy in the PPR perhaps a combination of compliance and economic incentive 
programs will be the best way of establishing farmers’ obligations and rights. 
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 2.4. Benefits of Wetlands 
Healthy wetland ecosystems provide an array of ecological goods and services to society.  These 
benefits can be divided into two categories 1) market goods and 2) non-market goods.  Non-
market goods can be further sub-divided into those with use-values and those with non-use or 
passive-use values (Wilson & Carpenter 1999, Hein et al.2006).  To further complicate matters, 
there are ecosystem benefits that provide use values for certain individuals and non-use values 
for others (Table 2.1).  It should be noted that the market benefits for freshwater ecosystems 
identified in Table 2.1 are mainly limited to larger wetlands, lakes or streams.  In the PPR, where 
the majority of wetlands consist of small isolated basins, we are primarily concerned with non-
market ecosystem benefits with the exception of carbon sequestration.  
 
Table 2.1 Benefits associated with freshwater ecosystems (Wilson and Carpenter 1999). 
Benefit Class Benefit Category Benefit subcategory Benefits 
Market Use In-water body Commercial Transportation 
 












In-water body Recreation 
 
Fishing, swimming, boating 
 Aesthetic Enhanced near-water recreation  
 
Hiking, picnicking, photography 
 Ecosystem Enhanced recreation support  
Other ecosystem services  
Wildlife viewing, hunting 
Erosion control, water quality, flood 
control, nutrient cycling, 
biodiversity, carbon storage & 






Significant others – family 
Diffuse others – public 
 
Any of the above 
 Existence or 
stewardship 
Inherent - remote wetlands 
Bequest –future generations 
 
Any of the above 
 
 Option Individual risk aversion Any of the above 
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 There are no market transactions or behavioural trends providing information about the value of 
non-market ecosystem benefits while the economic values associated with alternative land uses 
are often much easier to define.  For example, the value of potential crop yields or real estate 
development are easily accessible.  As a result, wetland benefits are often underestimated or 
ignored in traditional cost-benefit analysis (Lant 1994, Heimlich et al. 1998, Wilson and 
Carpenter 1999, Turner et al. 2000, Champ et al. 2003, Olewiler 2004, Brander et al. 2006).  The 
undervaluation of wetland ecosystems in private land management decisions has contributed to 
the conversion of wetlands into perceived valuable alternative land uses such as agricultural crop 
production, oil and gas exploration or urban development (Lant 1994, Olewiler 2004).  In 
Canada’s prairie region the greatest threat to wetlands continues to be agriculture (NWWG 1988, 
Wylynko 1999, Huel 2000, Euliss et al. 2006, NRC 2007).  Without an efficient approach to 
having wetland benefits considered in farm management decisions the destruction and alteration 
of these ecosystems will likely continue into the future.  Determining the value of wetland 
ecosystems is an important step in understanding the efficiency of wetland conservation policy 
which largely depends on non-market valuation techniques.  
 
2.4.1. Non-market Valuation of Wetland Resources 
Traditional neo-classical economics attempts to eliminate the market failure associated with non-
market, public goods by assigning an estimated dollar value to these goods in traditional benefit-
cost analysis.  Several attempts at valuing ecosystems through non-market valuation have 
appeared in the literature since the late 1960s (Hein et al. 2006).  However, due to the relatively 
recent development of these methods they are still considered to be flawed and are often 
criticized in the literature (Hanneman 1994).  A major criticism of non-market valuation studies 
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 is that they are specific to a particular study area and fixed point in time.  The valuation of 
specific wetland sites cannot be transferred to other sites that have not been studied and it is 
unknown how findings can be extrapolated to different scales; therefore the results of non-
market studies are very limited (Brander et al. 2006 and Wilson and Carpenter 1999).   
 
It is difficult to define and provide value estimates for all goods and services provided by 
wetlands.  The consequences of removing wetlands from the landscape are not fully understood 
and the true cost to society may not be completely realized for many years (Olewiler, 2004).  
Wetlands are complex ecosystems that can have varying degrees of relatedness to surrounding 
systems.  It is particularly difficult to determine the non-use benefits of wetlands as it is not 
known exactly what proportion of the population benefits from these non-use benefits and to 
what degree (Lant 1994, Leibowitz et al. 2000, Mitsch and Gosselink 2000, Turner et al. 2000, 
Olewiler, 2004).  Errors can also occur as a result of double-counting certain benefits which can 
lead to inaccurate estimation of wetland values (Hein et al. 2006).   
 
Another issue with defining and valuing wetland benefits is that optimizing for one benefit does 
not necessarily optimize for other benefits and sometimes optimizing for one benefit is at the 
expense of another (Mitsch and Gosselink 2000). For example, optimizing for recreation 
activities may be at the expense of wildlife habitat.  A partial solution to this problem is to rank 
the benefits and focus on those that have the greatest benefits for the greatest number of people 
(Lant 1994, Leibowitz et al. 2000).  Taking this idea a step further, some researchers select the 
top ranked benefits and create an index based on a combination of these benefits to allow 
comparability between sites; this is a similar methodology to that employed in the Conservation 
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 Reserves Program (CRP) in the U.S. (Feng & Kling 2005).  The CRP is a land retirement 
program delivered to farmers in the U.S. The CRP uses an environmental benefits index (EBI) 
that gives different weights to the environmental benefits and accounts for a cost factor as well to 
determine the lands that should be targeted for retirement.  Land parcels that would result in the 
highest level of benefits relative to costs based on the EBI are targeted first (Feng & Kling 2005).   
 
The scale of the ecosystem being studied affects the value of its benefits and the ease to which 
those values can be calculated (Mitsch and Gosselink 2000, Hein et al. 2006).  For example, 
valuing the benefits of an entire watershed or landscape will yield a value far greater than if a 
single wetland is valued.  However, it is much more difficult to complete a valuation study at the 
watershed scale and there is more room for error.  Figure 2.1 shows the probable importance of 
wetland benefits, the benefiting parties and the ease of calculation at different scales. 
 
Scale Ease of Calculation Accrual of Benefits Probable Importance 
Population Easy Land-owner/local 
economy 
Local economies 
Ecosystem   Local/regional public   
Biosphere Difficult The world Life sustaining 
Figure 2.1 Ease of calculation, accrual of benefits, and probable importance of values of 
wetlands at different ecological scales (adapted from Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000). 
 
The most common approach used to estimate values for non-use benefits is contingent valuation 
(CV).  CV is a stated preference method of non-market valuation; it is a direct method of 
calculation that does not require real market information.  There is a great deal of controversy 
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 surrounding CV in the economic community due to its creation of hypothetical markets which 
does not follow the trend of traditional economic analysis which is based on real market 
evaluation (Hanneman 1994).  There is also a great deal of concern in the instrument design and 
implementation across studies (Lant 1994). For example, the use of closed-ended or open-ended 
responses to CV questions is highly debated as this can have a significant impact on the end 
result; however, both methods are commonly used in the literature.  Additional criticisms of CV 
are beyond the scope of this study but they can easily be found in the literature (Hanneman 1994, 
Carson et al. 2001).  Despite its criticisms, the ability for CV to capture non-use values (by not 
requiring market information) and to be applied to a variety of spatial or temporal scales makes it 
the most appropriate non-market valuation method for valuing wetlands (Lant 1994). 
 
The contingent valuation methodology uses surveys to directly quantify people’s willingness to 
pay (WTP) for a particular environmental good or willingness to accept (WTA) to provide an 
environmental good.  For example, a CV survey usually outlines a proposed policy such as a 
wetland habitat preservation program.  Following a description of the program, a WTP question 
may look like the following: 
 
“With the implementation of the proposed policy you would have to pay an annual 
conservation payment into the foreseeable future, what is the highest amount that you 
would pay and still vote in favour of the policy?”  
 
Alternatively, a WTA question would ask those providing the environmental benefit; what is the 
minimum compensation payment amount that you would require to vote in favour of the policy?  
The responses may be open ended, where the respondent makes up their own value, or they may 
be closed-ended, where the respondent either has to choose from a range of values or simply 
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 votes yes or no to a single value provided.  By changing the quality or quantity of an 
environmental good outlined by the policy proposal there is an associated change in utility or 
welfare to all stakeholders.  Depending on the environmental change outlined by the policy 
proposal, stakeholders choose either the WTP or WTA amount to improve or maintain their 
current welfare status.   
 
Despite the criticisms and problems with non-market valuation, particularly CV, most 
researchers agree these studies show that society does attach a significant positive value to 
wetland ecosystems (Wilson and Carson 1999).  However, caution must be exercised in the use 
of non-market valuation to help achieve wetland conservation objectives.  If public values for 
ecological goods and services are determined, there is a need to transfer that value to private land 
owners so that there is an incentive for them to provide wetlands (Lant 1994).  In the absence of 
institutions and measures to transfer public value to the private landowner, wetlands will 
continue to decline unless farmers themselves recognize an inherent value in these ecosystems 
(Amigues et al. 2002). 
 
Non-market valuation can help determine the level of payment needed to encourage farmers to 
conserve wetland ecosystems.  In the past, contingent valuation studies have most often 
measured willingness to pay or compensating surplus (Champ et al. 2003).  Difficulties in 
defining these values have raised concerns about the ability of these non-market valuation 
studies to determine the benefits provided by wetlands.  Without this information, we lack the 
understanding of what level of wetland preservation would maximize net public and private 
benefits (Lant 1994).  
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 In terms of public value, it is more useful to employ an ecological measure that defines the 
quantity and quality of the ecosystem required to deliver an acceptable level of environmental 
goods to society.  The economic value of use is then the minimum willingness to accept amount 
for compensation in order for landowners to provide the established acceptable level of 
environmental benefits.  The WTA represents the financial incentive value required by 
landowners to provide wetlands and the associated environmental benefits on the landscape.  The 
WTA measure is accurate because there is a defined population and the compensation measure 
should be closely associated with the cost of restoration and maintenance and the value of the 
land in the best alternative land use (Amigues et al. 2002). 
 
Methods of transferring public values to landowners may come in the form of markets or through 
publicly funded conservation programs.  Government intervention through conservation program 
payments should be used with caution to avoid “conditioned cooperation”.  Conditional 
cooperation refers to farmers becoming accustomed to being financially compensated to manage 
for the environment, thus reducing the likelihood that they will provide environmental goods and 
services voluntarily (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Reeson and Tisdell 2006).  It is also 
recommended that government intervention through conservation program payments be a last 
resort to reduce public costs.  Therefore, it is important to understand how markets can be 
utilized to achieve conservation goals, which is discussed further in the next section. 
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 2.4.2. Market Value – Carbon Sequestration  
Due to increasing attention paid to global climate change, the focus of market benefits derived 
from prairie pothole wetland ecosystems in this study is carbon sequestration.  Private carbon 
markets such as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX 2008) were recently developed following 
the recognition of biological carbon sinks as an accepted mechanism for countries to meet their 
GHG emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (IPCC 2001).   
 
Since the industrial revolution there has been a 31% increase in atmospheric CO2 which is 
believed to be largely responsible for global climate change (IPCC 2001).  Conversion of 
grasslands and wetlands to cropland has released more than 30% of the original soil organic 
carbon to the atmosphere (Liebig et al. 2005).  Conversion to cropland has also affected 
atmospheric composition through reductions in ability of soils to sequester carbon and increases 
in other greenhouse gas emissions such as nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) (Bridgham et 
al. 2006 and Liebig et al. 2005).  It has been estimated that agriculture production has been 
responsible for up to 20% of the increases in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC 
2001).  As a result, farm management changes that can potentially lead to increases in soil 
organic carbon stocks have been widely cited as a potential strategy for the PPR to help mitigate 
climate change but up until recently the majority of this research has focused on the 
implementation of zero till, permanent cover and fertilizer management practices (Bruce et al. 
1998, Dumanski et al. 1998, Janzen et al. 1998, Lal and Bruce 1999, McConkey et al. 2000, 
McCarl and Schneider 2001, Smith et al. 2001, VandenBygaart et al. 2003, Boehm et al. 2004, 
Dumanski 2004, Lal 2004, Desjardins et al. 2005, Liang et al. 2005, Liebig et al. 2005, Pretty 
and Ball 2005, Hutchinson et al. 2007).  Within the last 5 years there has been growing 
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 recognition of the potential of wetlands as net carbon sinks in agricultural landscapes and 
wetland restoration has been cited as a carbon sequestration strategy (Slobodian et al. 2001, 
Dumanski 2004, Pennock 2005, Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006a, Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006b, 
Bridgham et al. 2006, Euliss et al. 2006, Müller et al. 2006, Pennock 2007). 
Unfortunately there has been little integration between agriculture and wetland carbon 
sequestration research.  It is not uncommon for agricultural studies to ignore wetlands and vice 
versa.  Furthermore, riparian buffer areas are often ignored completely as agricultural researchers 
often assume that they are part of the wetland and wetland researchers often assume that they are 
part of the upland.  This greatly limits the true understanding of carbon sequestration on an 
agricultural landscape. 
 
PPR wetlands can account for up to 23% of the agricultural landscape and wetland soils may 
store up to twice as much carbon as the surrounding agricultural land (Euliss et al. 2006).  
Carbon sequestration is achieved when plants uptake CO2 from the atmosphere and incorporate it 
into biomass which is then incorporated into the soil.  In wetlands soil organic carbon (SOC) is 
also sequestered by erosional deposition (sedimentation).  It has been suggested that SOC gains 
in wetlands are more stable than their upland counterparts because of aggregate formation and 
burial of SOC below the level of active decomposition (Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006b).   
 
The carbon sequestered by implementing environmentally beneficial management practices 
requires the investigation of any potential GHG emissions that may negate the SOC benefits.  
Methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) are currently the main sources of greenhouse gases in 
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 Canadian agriculture (Smith et al. 2001).  The relative impact of these greenhouse gases as a 
result of wetland and riparian vegetation restoration are discussed in greater detail below.   
 
Methane has 23 times the global warming potential of CO2 and is produced under anaerobic 
conditions which are prevalent in wetlands (IPCC 2001).  Additionally, methane emissions from 
wetlands are controlled by water chemistry, in particular sulfate (SO4
-
).  In the reduction 
sequence that leads to methane production, sulfate-reducing bacteria actively out-compete 
methane-producing methanogens.  Thus, with sufficient SO4
-
 in the water and sediment column 
the redox reaction required for methane production is not achieved (Schönheit et al. 1982).  The 
vast majority of semi-permanent and permanent wetlands in the PPR are dominated by SO4
-
 
anions so methane production is negligible.  Methane is emitted at relatively high rates from 
ephemeral wetlands; however, methane is produced regardless of the land use and restoring 
native vegetation is unlikely to have an effect on the net methane emissions (Pennock 2007a, 
Pennock 2007b and Pennock and Elliot 2007). 
 
Nitrous oxide has 296 times the global warming potential of CO2 (IPCC 2001) and in 
agricultural soils emissions depend on soil moisture conditions (Pennock and Corre 2001 and 
Yates et al. 2006). If water is maintained in the basin throughout the season N2O production is 
minimal.  Nitrous oxide production may occur in riparian areas and basins when water is drawn 
down below sediment level; however, emissions are considered to be minor in comparison to the 
SOC sequestration rates observed on the landscape (Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006a, Pennock 2007a, 
Pennock 2007b, Pennock and Elliot 2007).  Based on these previous studies it is apparent that the 
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 land use changes involved in the restoration of riparian vegetation is not deemed to have a 
significant effect on CH4 and N2O emissions in the PPR.   
 
The SOC sequestration potential of a given area depends on two overarching controls: 1) the 
initial SOC content prior to carbon sequestration practices and 2) the rate of C input under the 
prevailing environmental conditions (Janzen et al. 1998, VandenBygaart et al. 2003, Pennock 
2005).  Although the focus of this study is largely on wetlands and riparian areas it is recognized 
that these elements occur within a larger agricultural landscape matrix.  To determine the soil 
organic carbon sequestration potential of an agricultural field, the cropped areas must be 
considered as well.  Soil organic carbon sequestration may be strongly influenced by landform 
while crop type exerts little or no influence (Pennock and Corre 2001). 
 
Realistic carbon sequestration co-efficients (rate of C input) are needed to determine the 
potential carbon that can be stored over a specified time period.  These co-efficients are needed 
for all of the landscape elements under the different land-use options.  To determine the rate of C 
input by no-till under the prevailing environmental conditions, a review of the relevant literature 
is summarized in Table 2.2.  There is a general consensus that SOC sequestration by no-till can 
be sustained for 20-50 years before a steady state is reached (Dumanski et al. 1998, Boehm et al. 
2004, Desjardins et al. 2005).   
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Table 2.2 Carbon sequestration co-efficients for cropland under no-till. 
Region  Annual C 
Sequestered  
(Mg ha-1 yr-1) 
Regional Mean      
(Mg ha-1 yr-1) 
Source 
Brown Soil Zone 0.08  Smith et al. 2001 
 0.10  Liang et al. 2005  
 0.10  McConkey et al. 2000 
 0.13  Vandenbygaart et al. 2003 
 0.20  Boehm et al. 2004  
  0.12   
Dark Brown Soil Zone 0.14  Liang et al. 2005  
 0.15  Smith et al. 2001 
 0.20  Boehm et al. 2004  
 0.30  McConkey et al. 2000 
 0.37  Vandenbygaart et al. 2003 
  0.23   
PPR/Western Canada 0.20  Bruce et al. 1998 
 0.27  Liebig et al. 2005 
 0.2-0.3  Euliss et al. 2006 
 0.2-0.35  Desjardins et al. 2005 
 0.0-0.4  Hutchinson et al. 2007  
   0.24  
 
 
Few studies have investigated the potential of pothole wetlands and riparian areas to sequester 
carbon.  Bridgham et al. (2006) estimated that carbon could be sequestered in freshwater prairie 
wetland sediments at rates ranging from 0.17-1.85 Mg ha-1 yr-1 but these estimates were 
presented with a very high level of uncertainty.  Euliss et al. (2006) found that restored wetland 
soils can sequester up to 3.05 Mg C ha-1 yr-1.  Pennock and Elliot (2007) indicated that when 
cropland was restored to permanent cover or riparian vegetation SOC could be sequestered at an 
average rate of 1% per year over a 20 year period based on the initial carbon stores (Table 2.3).  
It is assumed that existing riparian and basin areas are at a steady state so no additional C is 
sequestered by maintaining these areas but they still represent a large carbon store on the 




 Table 2.3 Annual carbon sequestration co-efficients for restoring permanent vegetation in 
wetland basin, riparian and upland areas. 
Region Basinab 
(Mg C ha-1 yr-1) 
Riparianac 
(Mg C ha-1 yr-1) 
Uplandad 
(Mg C ha-1 yr-1) 
Brown Soil Zone 0.80 0.77 0.52 
Dark Brown Soil Zone  1.07 1.03 0.70 
a Average annual SOC increase based on a 1% increase each year for 20 years (Pennock and Elliot 2007). 
b Depression elements. 
c Convergent footslope elements.  
d Average of shoulder, backslope & divergent footslope elements. 
 
A review of the literature has thus suggested that restored wetlands represent the greatest 
potential for carbon sequestration (per hectare) on agricultural fields and a policy that targets 
these areas for restoration and conservation may be an effective strategy for carbon sequestration 
(Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006b). However, wetland influenced areas converted to cropland are 
often the most productive areas on the field in terms of crop production due to greater moisture 
availability, organic matter, N mineralization and favorable textural composition (Pennock et al. 
1994, Jowkin and Schoenau 1998, Si and Farrell 2004).  Pennock et al. (2001) found that canola 
yields in the black soil zone were 1.47 times greater in the depressional elements than the field 
mean.  Jowkin and Schoenau (1998) found that spring wheat yields in footslope elements in the 
brown soil zone were 1.15 -1.29 times greater than the field mean. This represents a positive 
relationship between land productivity and carbon sequestration potential which is problematic 
in terms of developing a cost effective policy.   
 
In 2007 and early 2008 the value of carbon contracts on the CCX ranged from $1.00 to $5.00 
CAD per tonne CO2 equivalent (CCX 2008), which represents approximately $3.00 to $20.00 
CAD per hectare in the brown and dark brown soil zones in the PPR based on the mean carbon 
sequestration rates found in Table 2.3.  Thus, the value of carbon contracts is considerably less 
than the mean agricultural production value on the same land which ranges from $74 to $117 per 
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 hectare (Table 3.4).  Thus, the opportunity cost associated with wetland restoration and 
maintenance is likely to greatly exceed the value of carbon (Feng and Kling 2005).  Another 
issue is that intact wetlands on the landscape represent large carbon stores (Bedard-Haughn et al. 
2006b).  Existing carbon stores are not eligible for trade on the private carbon market but there is 
still a need to maintain these stores to help mitigate climate change (Pretty and Ball 2005).  It is 
also unlikely that individual producers will be able to sequester enough carbon to participate in 
carbon markets without the use of a carbon aggregator.  The above discussion indicates that 
carbon markets alone may not be sufficient to entice farmers to restore and conserve wetland 
influenced areas.  Fortunately, there is potential for interplay between private carbon markets and 
government funded conservation programs to achieve conservation objectives. 
 
2.5. Targeting Considerations for Wetland Policy 
There are different targeting strategies to achieve environmental benefits.  For example, targeting 
for benefits alone enrolls land with the highest per-unit benefit regardless of cost.  Traditionally, 
environmental groups show a preference for benefit targeting (Wu et al. 2001).  But, research has 
indicated that the more stringent the environmental goals the more steeply the cost rises (Khanna 
et al. 2003).  Cost targeting enrolls land of the lowest cost regardless of the environmental 
benefits; this strategy is typically favored by private land owners but is largely considered 
socially inefficient (Wu et al. 2001).  The socially optimal targeting strategy may be benefit-cost 
targeting which targets land based on a benefit to cost ratio. 
 
With limited public funds, targeting is used to find the least cost way of meeting clearly defined 
environmental objectives within budget (Wu et al. 2001, Khanna et al. 2003, Zhao et al. 2003, 
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 Yang et al. 2003, Yang and Weersink 2004, Yang et al. 2005, Marshall and Homans 2006).  In 
addition, designing an efficient wetland policy relies on strategies that reflect farmer preferences 
so the policy is readily adopted (Lovell and Sullivan 2006).  Thus, it is important to determine 
how to target policy on the landscape by considering environmental objectives and cost-
effectiveness to meet objectives within the context of social and farmer preferences. 
 
An important consideration for wetland policy is the correlations between benefits and agri-
economic costs (Figure 2.2).  When environmental benefits are negatively correlated to agri-
economic costs the areas that cost the least are also more likely to offer larger environmental 
benefits.  The winners are easily capable of compensating the losers which results in a classic 
“win-win” situation for multiple stakeholders. On the other hand, when costs and benefits are 
positively correlated, the least cost targeting strategies are also more likely to offer fewer 
benefits.  When benefits and costs are positively correlated it is a “win-lose” situation and trade-
offs exist between private economic costs and social environmental benefits, thus, there are vast 
differences in the policy preferences of stakeholders (Wu et al. 2001). 
 
 
A  “Win – Win” 
Environmental Benefits




















Figure 2.2 Possible relationships between agri-economic costs and environmental benefits; A 




 2.5.1. Targeting for Benefits vs. Management Practices 
It is recommended that policy strategies be based on the most cost-effective strategy to meet 
clearly defined environmental objectives within given budget constraints (Wu et al. 2001, 
Khanna et al. 2003, Zhao et al. 2003, Yang et al. 2003, Yang and Weersink 2004, Yang et al. 
2005, Marshall and Homans 2006).  Managing for environmental benefits can be achieved 
through targeting specific benefit goals or management practice goals (McCarl and Schneider 
2001, Zhao et al 2003).  Managing for multiple co-benefits simultaneously has been shown to be 
complicated and less efficient so it becomes essential to target an effective environmental policy 
to the most important benefits or management practices (Lant 1994). For a wetland conservation 
program that plans to utilize the carbon market, the question arises; should the policy be targeted 
to a benefit such as carbon sequestration or wetland management practices? Although it is 
generally assumed that environmental co-benefits are positively correlated, optimizing for single 
benefit goals can result in very different allocations of land use and co-benefits on the landscape 
(Mitsch and Gosselink 2000, McCarl and Schneider 2001, Zhao et al. 2003, Feng and Kling 
2004, Feng et al. 2005).  Thus, it is important to understand the correlations that exist among 
different environmental benefits. 
 
The initial focus for policy design is on carbon sequestration benefits due to the considerable 
attention it has been given lately as a climate change mitigation strategy and the possible use of 
carbon markets to offset publicly funded program costs.  In addition, management practices that 
lead to carbon sequestration on agricultural fields are widely recognized as providing significant 
environmental co-benefits (positive externalities) such as erosion reduction, wildlife habitat and 
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 biodiversity (Zhao et al. 2003, Dumanski 2004, Feng and Kling 2005, Feng et al. 2005, Lambert 
et al. 2006).   
 
Programs that are designed specifically for a single benefit, such as carbon sequestration, will 
use least cost management practices to achieve that particular goal.  Although the co-benefits of 
carbon sequestration are significant, they are primarily external to the farmer so these values will 
not be incorporated into management decisions.  Thus, the cost-effectiveness of targeting for 
carbon sequestration benefits in a wetland conservation policy is dependent on the relationship 
between soil productivity and soil carbon sequestration on the landscape. The discussion in 
section 2.4.2 indicates that a positive relationship exists between the soil productivity and carbon 
sequestration in wetland influenced areas.  Therefore, in terms of carbon sequestration farmers 
will readily adopt management practices that are more cost-effective such as zero-till, nutrient 
management and crop rotation to meet carbon sequestration goals while practices associated with 
greater costs such as foregone crop production associated with riparian areas are unlikely to be 
adopted even though the co-benefits would be greater (Dumanski 2004, Lambert et al. 2006).  
Furthermore, even when financial assistance is provided for carbon programs that require land 
retirement, in general, only large farms participate and they enrol only a relatively small 
proportion of their farm in the program (Lambert et al. 2006).   
 
From a wetland policy stand-point, it is likely more efficient to design a policy that focuses on 
management practices that result in the maintenance and restoration of wetlands to achieve 
multiple co-benefits rather than requiring certain levels of carbon sequestration. Furthermore, 
McCarl and Schneider (2001) and Zhao et al. (2003) found that policies with management 
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 practice goals often have a higher level of success in encouraging participation and ultimately 
achieving net environmental benefits than policies that focused directly on benefit goals. 
 
 
2.5.2. Spatial Targeting 
If wetland restoration and conservation is the management goal, understanding wetland 
ecosystem function is essential to determine the proper spatial units to be considered in economic 
analysis and in policy.  For example, in temperate regions, it is suggested that 3-7% of the 
landscape be composed of wetlands to provide adequate environmental services (Mitsch and 
Gosselink 2000).  It is also important to determine how to target policy on a local scale to meet 
landscape ecosystem objectives.   
 
Landscape function is defined as the net effect of all ecosystems on the landscape, including 
synergistic effects, and the value of individual wetlands is dependent on where they are in the 
landscape and how closely associated they are with other systems (Leibowitz et al. 2000, Mitsch 
and Gosselink 2000).  Thus, the benefits of a single wetland or single parcel of land may be 
negligible but it can make important contributions on the landscape by creating and maintaining 
connectivity.  This suggests that it is more beneficial to have wide participation on the landscape 
rather than maximizing benefits on a few parcels.  Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) suggest that 
providing bonuses to enrol land that is in close proximity to other conserved parcels of land can 
be important in ensuring contiguous habitat.  However, coordination in this type of program 
requires expertise and farmers not familiar with this type of system are unlikely to adopt it.  
Ultimately, participation in conservation programs is still affected by initial beliefs and direct 
financial assistance (Parkhurst and Shogren 2007). 
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Developing efficient financial incentive levels for wetland conservation policy is usually 
achieved by targeting watersheds as a single spatial unit (Lant et al. 2005, Lovell and Sullivan 
2006).  However, in the PPR many wetlands do not contribute to a larger watershed but it is still 
important to improve and maintain connectivity of native ecosystems on the landscape.  In this 
case it may be more suitable to base spatial units on soil, vegetation and climatic characteristics.  
For example, the spatial units could be based on soil zones, ecoregions or soil polygons, which 
are composed of relatively homogeneous soils and similar environmental characteristics. 
     
At the local scale it is important to determine which wetlands on the landscape should be 
targeted and the width of riparian area or buffer strip that needs to be provided to achieve 
essential ecosystem functions for individual wetlands.  Prairie wetlands represent a variety of 
different ecosystems which are effectively described by the Stewart and Kantrud (1971) wetland 
classification scheme (Table 2.4). The wetland classification scheme is based on permanency of 
water in the basin throughout the growing season; greater water permanency indicates a greater 
number of vegetation zones within a particular wetland and generally greater biodiversity.  
However, maximum biodiversity is achieved on the landscape by providing a variety of different 
ecosystems which includes both permanent and seasonal wetlands.   
 
Table 2.4 Classification of freshwater prairie wetlands (Stewart and Kantrud 1971). 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 
Water 
Residence 
Ephemeral Temporary Seasonal Semi-Permanent Permanent 
Vegetation 
Zones 
wetland low prairie wetland low prairie 
wet meadow 
wetland low prairie 
wet meadow 
shallow marsh 











 Due to the high degree of physical and chemical variability in wetlands across the PPR the 
benefits are also highly variable across wetlands.  In general, the wetlands that remain on 
agricultural landscapes are those that are less suitable for crop production or are too difficult or 
expensive to drain/cultivate.  These are typically permanent or saline wetlands (NWWG, 1988). 
In general, due to the nature of wetlands in Saskatchewan’s PPR, wetland restoration can often 
be achieved with the elimination of cultivation from wetland influenced areas on the landscape. 
In other words, active restoration involving the physical construction of dams or barriers is not 
usually required for restoration. In the case of permanent wetlands, the majority of basins still 
remain intact on the landscape but their margins, or riparian areas, have been encroached upon 
by cultivation which limits the wetland’s ability to function.  Restoration and enhancement of 
these permanent wetlands can often be achieved by simply expanding the perennially vegetated 
riparian areas surrounding the existing basins to reflect the true influence of wetlands on the 
landscape.  Many of the seasonal wetlands have been cultivated and cropped in their entirety, 
essentially eliminating their presence on the agricultural landscape.  The restoration of these 
seasonal wetlands would depend on cessation of cultivation through both their basins and 
riparian areas.  It is often perceived that small wetlands provide negligible benefits and therefore 
there is no need to conserve them; however, conservation of wetlands should follow the law of 
scarcity, when fewer exist they should be viewed as more valuable and be incorporated into 
policy objectives (Mitsch and Gosselink 2000).   
 
There is not a general consensus among scientists regarding a standard riparian zone width 
required for healthy wetland functioning in the PPR.  However, few examples in the literature 
indicate that a riparian buffer width of 10-30m is usually required for proper functioning 
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 depending on the size and class of wetland (Huel 2000, Rickerl et al. 2000, Phillips et al. 2005).  
There is some discussion over the use of precision riparian buffers, which are based on physical 
characteristics of each individual wetland such as elevation, soil electrical conductivity and 
vegetation, as opposed to the use of fixed-width riparian buffers.  Since precision buffers are 
based on the actual physical conditions of each wetland, they represent each wetland’s true 
influence on the landscape.  Therefore, several researchers support the use of precision 
conservation buffers because they are biologically optimal and may be more cost-effective if the 
total area that needs to be preserved under a precision buffer scenario is considerably less than 
for a fixed buffer width scenario (Yang et al. 2003, Yang and Weersink 2004, Dosskey et al. 
2005).  However, the implementation of a precision buffer program design can be more costly 
than a fixed buffer due to the transaction costs associated with the technical equipment and 
expertise required to establish precision buffer areas.  Dosskey et al. (2005) argue that the higher 
transaction costs in a precision buffer program can be offset by eliminating unnecessary costs 
associated with retiring land that can still reasonably be in crop production.  However, an issue 
arises with who is responsible for the costs associated for this type of program. Most farmers 
cannot afford to implement a conservation buffer design on their fields and do not have technical 
capabilities.  On the other hand, a government delivered extension program that provides this 
expertise is also costly.  Another issue with a precision riparian approach is that many farmers do 
not respond well to irregular patterns in their fields which is viewed as unsightly and 
inconvenient (Dosskey et al. 2005). 
 
It has been widely suggested that environmental policies that use land retirement as a tool should 
focus first on fields with the lowest marginal cost and then move up until environmental 
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 objectives are met.  Payments made on a per unit benefit/cost basis capture spatial heterogeneity, 
and land with the highest benefit per dollar should be targeted first which makes it very 
important to determine early on which benefit(s) are being optimized (Leibowitz 2000, Khanna 
et al. 2003, Feng and Kling 2004 and Feng et al. 2005).  It is also important to remember that for 
a wetland conservation program we are not necessarily targeting entire fields for retirement but 
wetland elements within the fields.   
 
Transaction costs should also be considered in policy design as they can make a significant 
contribution to the overall program cost. Allowing too much variation within a program usually 
imposes increased administrative costs and a requirement for technical expertise. For example, a 
precision buffer wetland conservation program may be more cost-effective in terms of program 
payments but the increased transaction costs may negate any of the benefits achieved with 
precision conservation program.  In addition, site specific programs are difficult to implement 
because they are viewed as unfair and they pose political and administrative difficulties (Khanna 
et al. 2003, Yang et al. 2003). 
 
There also needs to be consideration for the output effects of spatially targeted financial 
incentive schemes. If only land that is in current production is targeted then there is a perverse 
incentive to put land that is already idle back into production to offset the cost of retiring other 
lands (Wu et al. 2001).  This has important policy implications for wetlands in the PPR; to avoid 
such perverse incentives a policy where both restored and existing wetlands areas are eligible for 
enrolment in the conservation program may be necessary. 
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 2.5.2.1. Climate change impacts on wetlands 
An often overlooked aspect of spatial targeting of environmental policies is the effect of climate 
change on the benefits that can be achieved under different targeting scenarios.  In the previous 
section seasonal wetlands were identified as valuable elements on the landscape that could 
potentially be targeted for restoration and conservation initiatives.  However, Larson (1995) 
found that climate explains 60% percent of the variation in basin numbers, water levels and 
vegetation structure in the PPR. Climate change is likely to result in many seasonal wetlands 
drying up for longer periods of time than would be expected with the previously normal climate 
cycles or they may dry up permanently (Larson 1995, Poiani et al. 1996, Johnson et al. 2005).  
This may negate some of the important benefits that conservation programs strive toward 
including wildlife habitat, biodiversity and carbon sequestration.  For example, prime migratory 
bird habitat is found in wetlands that have a ratio of emergent vegetation cover to open water 
approaching 1:1, as open water provides food and breeding habitat while emergent vegetation 
provides cover and nesting habitat (Poiani 1993).  If open water is eliminated from these 
wetlands entirely, there will be too much vegetation cover to be utilized by migratory birds 
(Johnson et al. 2005).  Less available moisture would also reduce overall biomass production and 
potentially reduce the amount of soil organic carbon that can be sequestered. 
 
Modelling scenarios of climate change show that wetlands in the dry areas of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan will be the most highly impacted ecosystems (Johnson et al. 2005).  In addition, 
semi-permanent and permanent wetlands that have previously held water throughout the spring 
and early summer seasons are in danger because they could potentially dry up early enough in 
the season to be cultivated for crop production. Furthermore, increasing grain prices, partially 
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 due to bio-fuel demands, are driving farmers to maximize the amount of area that they can put 
into production.  This indicates that not only should wetland conservation programs target semi-
permanent and permanent wetlands but also focus more on the wetter, fringe areas of the PPR 
because greater benefits can be accrued (Johnson et al. 2005).  Unfortunately, these wetter, 
fringe areas are also the most productive areas for agriculture where more than 90% of the 
wetlands have already been drained or altered (Tiner 2003).  The restoration costs in these areas 
are much greater than in drier regions due to greater soil productivity and more favourable 
environmental conditions for crop production, thereby making the targeting of wetter regions 
prohibitive from a cost perspective.  There are also concerns with program equity in that policy 
makers are hesitant to favour farmers in one region over another. 
 
2.6. Social vs. private planning horizon 
Management decisions and policies that are based on short and long-term models result in very 
different landscape patterns (Marshall and Homans 2006).  Farm management is based on 
economic efficiency and maximizing farm income in the current time period and immediate 
future (e.g. 1-5 years). It is likely that current investments in ecological capital would reduce 
farm income in the short-term but these investments may actually increase farm income in future 
time periods (Lant et al. 2005).  However, due to volatile markets and income instability in 
agriculture, risk adverse farmers will try to maximize their net benefits in the current time period 
while future time periods are largely ignored. It has been widely recognized in the economic 
literature that private land owners will not act altruistically for the sake of environmental 
protection and public benefits if it does not improve their immediate net private benefits 
(Danielson & Leitch 1986, Turner et al. 2000, Lant et al. 2005).  The current market trend of 
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 increasing grain prices in the PPR, in-part due to growth in the bio-fuels industry, may bring 
even more marginal wetland areas into production for short-term economic gain.  Furthermore, 
the 2006 Statistics Canada Census of Agriculture reported that the farm population in 
Saskatchewan is aging with an uncertainty as to how long that they will continue to farm and 
many of them without successors; this indicates that there is little or no inherent value to 
conserve or manage for future generations. 
 
Similar to farmers, public policy makers also have a relatively short-term time horizon with their 
main objective being re-election after 4-5 years (Fuguitt and Wilcox 1999).  The relatively short-
term planning horizon of individual landowners and politicians contrasts with social values.  
Society generally believes that it has a responsibility to ensure that the welfare of both current 
and future generations are taken into account in the allocation of resources (Fuguitt and Wilcox 
1999).  The economic value gained in the short-term may be great but it is finite (e.g. 50-100 
years) while the benefits of wetland ecosystems are accrued in perpetuity.  However, if wetland 
destruction continues for short-term economic gain the effects of such projects may be 
irreversible and wetland values may be lost indefinitely (Mitsch and Gosselink 2000).     
 
Many of the current conservation programs that were discussed previously have commitment 
periods of 10 years (e.g. Conservation Reserves Program in the U.S. and the Greencover 
Program in Canada).  While these programs may already extend over a greater period of time 
than most farmers would traditionally plan for, the extent of environmental benefits that can be 
realized in that time is only a fraction of their full potential.  For example, landowners in the 
CRP are eligible to put their land back into production after 10 years; if this land reverts to crop 
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 production the benefits gained from the program are essentially eliminated.  Therefore, although 
programs have to be designed with a finite time period that is suitable for farm management, 
there is also a need to re-negotiate contracts after the program period and encourage farmers to 
maintain their reserved lands so that benefits can be realized in the long term. 
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 3.0 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN WETLAND POLICY: AN EMPIRICAL 




Saskatchewan’s agricultural region is primarily made up of the previously glaciated area known 
as the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) (Figure 1.1).  Wetlands historically made up 23% of the land 
area in the PPR but it is estimated that 50 -70% of these wetlands have been lost or altered 
primarily because of agricultural drainage and cultivation (NWWG 1988, EC 1991, Wylynko 
1999, Euliss et al. 2006).  Along with the destruction of native habitat, the conversions of 
grasslands and wetlands to cropland have reduced the capabilities of soil to sequester carbon and 
have caused the released of up to 35% of the soils’ original carbon stores as carbon dioxide 
(CO2) into the atmosphere, contributing to global climate change (Gregorich et al. 1995, 
Dumanski et al. 1998, Janzen et al. 1998, Smith et al. 2001, VandenBygaart et al. 2003, Liebig 
et al. 2005, Bridgham et al. 2006).   
 
With growing concern about climate change and Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 
December 2002, there has been increasing attention paid to the potential of wetlands and 
agricultural lands to help mitigate climate change by restoring and maintaining carbon stores.  
There is also increasing recognition of other benefits associated with wetlands, strengthened by 
Canada’s international commitments under multilateral environmental agreements such as the 
Ramsar Convention for wetland mitigation, the Migratory Birds Convention Act for the 
protection of wildlife habitat and The Convention on Biological Diversity.  These treaties along 
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 with changing social attitudes towards managing for the environment have created a public 
demand for policies that protect wetlands ecosystems (EC 1991). 
 
Economists often cite the loss of wetlands on the prairie landscape as a market failure due to the 
inability of farmers to capitalize on the social benefits provided by wetlands.  With little inherent 
financial motivation for farmers to provide ecological goods and services on the landscape 
formal incentives have become an important policy tool to encourage farmers to manage for the 
environment.  Developing publicly funded incentive programs that focus on the restoration and 
conservation of wetlands can result in multiple environmental benefits, such as carbon 
sequestration, wildlife habitat and biodiversity, that can help Canada honour its commitments to 
international environmental treaties.  
 
This study investigates land use allocation and the carbon sequestration potential of agricultural 
landscapes in the PPR.  First, the characteristics of farmers that may influence their participation 
in environmental conservation are investigated, in particular for maintaining healthy wetland and 
riparian ecosystems on agricultural land, both in the absence and presence of financial 
incentives.   An empirical investigation is also conducted on the interplay between free market 
carbon-based payments and publicly funded conservation programs as policy tools to encourage 
farmers to restore and maintain wetland and riparian areas on privately owned agricultural land.  
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 3.2. Carbon Sequestration Potential of Saskatchewan Agricultural Landscapes 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, biological carbon sinks have been accepted as mechanisms for 
countries to meet their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction commitments. As a result of 
this decision, management changes such as zero-till and wetland restoration, which can 
potentially lead to increases in soil organic carbon (SOC) stocks, have been widely cited as 
strategies to help mitigate climate change (Slobodian et al. 2001, Dumanski 2004, Pennock 
2005, Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006a, Bedard-Haughn et al. 2006b, Bridgham et al. 2006, Euliss et 
al. 2006, Müller et al. 2006, Pennock 2007). However, there has been little integration between 
agricultural and wetland research on carbon sequestration.  
 
Carbon sequestration is achieved when plants uptake carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere 
and incorporate it into biomass that is then incorporated into the soil.  Historically, the wetland 
and grassland ecosystems in the PPR were believed to be in a steady state with the carbon stock 
in the soil at its maximum carbon storage potential.  The conversion of these native ecosystems 
to annual cultivation resulted in increased decomposition rates and a resulting net decrease of 
SOC stocks in agricultural soils and a contribution to increased atmospheric concentration of 
CO2.   
 
Canadian agricultural lands are estimated to have lost 15-35% of their pre-settlement SOC stores 
(Gregorich et al. 1995, Dumanski et al. 1998, Janzen et al. 1998, Smith et al. 2001, 
VandenBygaart et al. 2003).  In the PPR it is estimated that wetlands can account for up to 23% 
of the agricultural landscape area and wetland soils could store up to twice as much carbon as the 
surrounding agricultural land as a result of relatively large accumulations of biomass and also 
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 erosional deposition (sedimentation) from the surrounding uplands (Euliss et al. 2006).  In 
addition, SOC gains in wetlands may be more stable than their upland counterparts because of 
aggregate formation and burial of SOC below the level of active decomposition (Bedard-Haughn 
et al. 2006).  Thus, the carbon storage potential of restored wetland areas can make significant 
contributions to the overall carbon storage potential of these agricultural landscapes. 
 
The carbon sequestered by implementing environmentally beneficial management practices, such 
as wetland vegetation restoration, requires an investigation of the GHG emissions that may offset 
SOC benefits.  Methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) are generally the greenhouse gases of 
greatest concern in Canadian agricultural landscapes (Smith et al. 2001).  Research conducted by 
Bedard-Haughn et al. (2006) and Pennock et al. (2007) suggests that emissions of CH4 and N2O 
due to restoration of riparian vegetation are negligible relative to the total amount of carbon that 
is sequestered.  Emissions of CH4 and N2O are largely controlled by hydrological conditions, 
since the restoration of permanent vegetation is not deemed to significantly impact the hydrology 
of these restored areas, emissions are also not greatly influenced by this land use change. For this 
reason, only the SOC sequestration potential of wetland areas was considered in the total carbon 
balance for this study.  An empirical investigation of the carbon sequestration potential of 
agricultural fields, including wetlands, is included in this study to determine the potential value 




3.3. Materials and Methods 
 
3.3.1. Site Description 
The two study regions used in this research were selected to represent distinct agricultural 
regions within the prairie pothole region in Saskatchewan.  The study regions were centred on 
Statistics Canada Census Agriculture Regions (CAR) 3AN and 8B (Figure 3.1).  A case study 
farm was also selected for both regions for a more in depth analysis of wetland conservation 
program designs on specific landscapes.  The 65 ha McInnis (MCI) site was located in 3AN and 
the 66 ha St. Denis National Wildlife Area (SDNWA) site was located in 8B.  These study sites 
were part of a larger collaborative study focused on understanding the role of wetlands, riparian 
zones and land management in GHG dynamics within agricultural landscapes, funded by Ducks 
Unlimited Canada and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada   These sites were chosen for this 
portion of the study based on their similar management history which facilitates comparisons 
between regions.  Both sites were originally broken in the early 1920s and were conventionally 





Figure 3.1 The study regions and case study farms in relation to the soil zones and ecoregions of 
the province of Saskatchewan. 
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 3.3.1.1. Biophysical 
The MCI site is located in Brown soil zone and Mixed Grassland ecoregion of south central 
Saskatchewan (50°39’N, 106°49’W).  The site has moderately textured soils on a moderately to 
steeply sloping, hummocky landscape.  The soils of MCI are considered to have severe 
limitations to agriculture production due to poorly drained depressions, eroded knolls and 
relatively steep topography (Ayres et al. 1985).  Prior to cultivation the uplands of the MCI site 
were dominated by native mid and short-grass species.  The wetland and depressional areas are 
characterized by hydrophytic grasses, sedges, rushes and other herbaceous species, some of the 
wet margins support willow species (Salix spp.) and shrubs (Ayres et al. 1985).  The climate of 
the MCI area is characterized by warm summers and cold winters with moderately low 
precipitation.  The temperature ranges, in the extreme, from +42°C in summer to -47°C in 
winter, July is the warmest month with a mean daily temperature of 19°C while January is the 
coldest month with a mean daily temperature of -13°C.  The average annual precipitation is 
approximately 372mm with the majority (approximately 70%) of the precipitation falling 
between May and September (EC 2007).      
 
The SDNWA is located in the transition zone from Dark Brown to the Black soil zone of central 
Saskatchewan and in the Aspen Parkland ecoregion (52°12’N, 106°5’W).  The soils are 
moderately textured occurring on moderate to steeply sloping hummocky landscape.  The soils 
of SDNWA are also considered to have severe limitations to agriculture production due to poorly 
drained depressions, eroded knolls and relatively steep topography (Acton and Ellis 1978).  Prior 
to cultivation the dominant upland vegetation at SDNWA was native mid-grasses and some 
shrubs.  The wetlands and depressional areas are characterized by grasses, sedges and 
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 hydrophytic herbs and are often associated with woody species including trembling aspen 
(Populus tremuloides Michx.), balsam poplar (Populus balsamifera) and willow species (Salix 
spp.) (Hogan and Conly 2002).  The climate of the SDNWA area is also characterized by warm 
summers and cold winters with moderately low precipitation.  The extreme temperature ranges 
from +40°C in summer to -50°C in winter.  July is the warmest month with a mean daily 
temperature of 18°C while January is the coldest month with a mean daily temperature of -17°C.  
The average annual precipitation is approximately 350mm with the majority (approximately 
70%) of the precipitation falling between May and September (EC 2007). 
 
The slightly cooler climate at SDNWA results in a lower evaporative demand than at MCI.  
Thus, more moisture is available for plant growth at SDNWA than at MCI which has resulted in 
distinct differences in vegetation composition and soil characteristics including soil organic 
carbon stores (Table 3.1).  The increased available moisture results in increased biomass, 
including woody species, and subsequent soil organic carbon contributing to greater SOC stores 
at SDNWA.  In addition, SDNWA and CAR 8B are characterized by a greater number of 
wetlands and riparian treed areas, that occupy a greater proportion of the landscape, than in MCI 
and CAR 3AN 
 
The wetlands found in the PPR are best described by the Stewart and Kantrud (1971) 
classification of freshwater prairie wetlands (Table 2.4).  This classification divides freshwater 
wetlands into 5 classes determined by the permanency of water in the basin throughout the 
growing season.  For the purpose of this study wetlands have been fitted into two categories: 1) 
seasonal wetlands (Stewart and Kantrud (1971) class 1, 2 and 3 wetlands); and 2) permanent 
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 wetlands (Stewart and Kantrud (1971) class 4 and 5 wetlands).  This distinction was based on 
how wetlands are currently allocated on the landscape.  In general, the wetlands that remain on 
agricultural landscapes are those that are not suitable for crop production or are too difficult or 
expensive to drain/cultivate.  These are typically semi-permanent, permanent or saline wetlands 
(NWWG, 1988). 
 
Table 3.1 Estimated current soil organic carbon stores at MCI and SDNWA, Saskatchewan 
based on results from Bedard-Haughn et al. (2006b).  



















Uncultivated Basinc 4.5 141.3 637.5  7.8 191.0 1484.1 
Uncultivated Ripariand (Grass) 5.2 99.9 516.3  8.6 135.0 1159.7 
Uncultivated Ripariand (Tree)     4.8 195.0 926.9 
Cultivated Basinc 0.4 76.2 29.9  0.3 103.0 29.9 
Cultivated Ripariand 7.0 73.2 510.7  3.1 98.9 302.2 
Cultivated Uplande 47.7 49.9 2380.5  41.8 67.4 2814.5 
Total 64.8  4074.9  66.2  6717.3 
a Based on Bedard-Haughn et al. (2006b) data collected at SDNWA in the Dark Brown soil zone.  Medium textured 
soils in the Brown soil zone have about 74% of the SOC in similar soils of the Dark Brown soil zone according to 
Rostad et al. (1993) and Liang et al. (2005) so estimates for MCI were scaled back accordingly. 
b Based on Bedard-Haughn et al. (2006b) data collected at SDNWA in the Dark Brown soil zone. 
cDepression elements. 
dConvergent footslope elements.  
eShoulder, backslope & divergent footslope elements. 
 
The nature of wetland allocation in Saskatchewan’s PPR allows this study to limit the definition 
of wetland restoration to the elimination of cultivation from wetland influenced areas on the 
landscape. In other words, active restoration involving the physical construction of dams or 
barriers is not considered. In the case of permanent wetlands, the majority of basins still remain 
intact on the landscape but wetland margins or riparian areas have been encroached upon by 
cultivation which limits their ability to function.  Restoration and enhancement of the function of 
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 these permanent wetlands can often be achieved by simply expanding riparian areas surrounding 
the existing basins to reflect the true influence of wetlands on the landscape.  Many of the 
seasonal wetlands across the landscape have been cultivated and cropped in their entirety, 
essentially eliminating their presence on the agricultural landscape.  The restoration of these 




Both of the study regions are pre-dominantly agricultural regions.  Farm socio-economic data 
was acquired using a mail-out survey conducted in July 2007 (Appendix D).  Further details of 
the survey will be discussed in later sections of this paper. Comparisons between the study 
regions were conducted in SPSS  v.15 using a 2-sample t-test and ANOVA for continuous data 
and a chi-square test for categorical data with a significance level of α=0.05 (Table 3.2).   
 
Table 3.2 Socio-economic characteristics of farms and operators, N signifies sample size. 
Characteristic 3AN (N) 8B (N) All (N) 
Mean Age 52.2 (55) 51.9 (157) 52 (212) 






% Farmers with Off-Farm Income 51 (55) 58 (157) 56 (212) 
Mean Years Continuing to Farm 19 (45) 16 (127) 17 (172) 
Mean Years Farm in Family  75 (54) 69 (156) 71 (210) 
Mean Farm Area 809 (55) 678 (151) 713 (206) 
Mean proportion owned (%) 83* (55) 73 (151) 76 (206) 
* Significant at P<0.05 
 
The only characteristic that is significantly different between regions, based on our survey 
results, is land tenure.  Farmers in 3AN are more likely to own a larger proportion of their land, 
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 but from a practical aspect this difference is negligible as the vast majority of land in both 
regions is owned.  The average farmer is 52 years of age, has a high school or technical diploma 
and plans to continue farming for 17 years.  Of farmers planning to retire within the next 10 
years, only 21% indicate that someone in the family will take over the farm, 44% indicate that no 
one in the family will take over, but most notably 34% did not know.  Many farmers indicated 
that they didn’t know how long they would continue to farm because there was no one to take 
over.  Some farmers said that they would continue farming as long as their health held up or until 
they died.  For many farmers this uncertainty indicates that there is lack of a defined planning 
horizon which may influence how they make their farm management decisions.  There is 
definitely a sense of frustration among the aging farm population. This uncertainty among a large 
proportion of the farm population adds to the challenge of designing effective environmental 
policies. 
 
3.3.2. Farmer Characteristics 
As a component of the research a survey was conducted in both study regions to help identify 
farmer characteristics that may influence the management of wetlands on agricultural fields and 
participation in the current environmental programs available to farmers (Appendix D).  Ethics 
approval was granted for this survey by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research 
Ethics Board on June 26, 2007 (Appendix C). A letter of invitation (Figure D1), survey 
questionnaire (Figure D2) and prize draw form (Figure D3) were delivered to all registered farm 
mail boxes in CAR 3AN and 8B on July 10, 2007 followed by a reminder post card (Figure D4) 
three weeks later.  To increase the response rate all completed surveys received within 8 weeks 
were entered into a draw for a prize valued at $200 cdn.  A total of 4110 surveys were mailed 
78 
 
 out, approximately 650 of these were mailed to farmers located outside of our study regions.  
Although it was assumed that all farmers in the study regions received a survey, the nature of the 
delivery mode makes it is impossible to estimate how many of the surveys went undelivered.  
The response rate to the survey was 5.2% in CAR 3AN and 6.5% in CAR 8B, within an overall 
response rate was 6.1%. The different response rates between regions may be related to the 
timing of harvest in 2007, CAR 3AN began harvest relatively early (late July) which may have 
distracted farmers from completing the survey.  In addition, since it was impossible to determine 
the actual number of surveys received by study area farmers the response rate reported above 
represents a minimum response rate with the actual response rate greater than or equal to this but 
unknown.   
 
Due to the relatively low response rate of this survey, demographic characteristics were 
compared to 2006 Statistics Canada Census of Agriculture data to determine if our sample was 
representative of the population.  Average farm size and farmer age were compared for each 
R.M. in the study regions, no significant difference was found between the census data and our 
survey data for these variables.  This indicates that in terms of demographics, our survey sample 
was representative of the population within each region.  There was a likely bias towards crop 
producers as the majority of the questions referred to crop production, as a result very few 
surveys were returned from cattle producers.  
 
The survey data was used to conduct an econometric analysis of the potential influences on 
wetland management and participation in environmental programs. This analysis was completed 




Understanding the characteristics that influence wetland management and participation in the 
current programs can help determine if using financial incentives is a valid way to proceed in 
wetland conservation policy.  We identified the maintenance of riparian buffers and plans to 
drain wetlands in the next 5 years as dependent variables representing wetland management in 
the econometric analysis.  Participation in the Environmental Farm Plan program (EFP) was 
chosen as a dependent variable to represent a current economic incentive-based environmental 
program.   
 
The EFP program was chosen because it is available to all farmers in our study regions and it 
facilitates the flow of financial incentives from partner economic-incentive based programs.  The 
EFP program was developed by the Canadian federal government as part of its’ new Agricultural 
Policy Framework (AAFC 2008).  Environmental Farm Plans are voluntary self-assessments to 
promote awareness of environmental sustainability and environmentally beneficial management 
practices (BMP).  Each province oversees delivery in its jurisdiction.  In Saskatchewan EFPs are 
delivered and reviewed by the Provincial Council of Agricultural Development and 
Diversification Board, a non-profit agricultural organization that specializes in the delivery of 
farm programming (PCAB 2008).  Farmers who have completed an EFP and who have had it 
reviewed and accepted are eligible to apply to the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s National 
Farm Stewardship Program and Greencover Canada program which offer cost-shared incentives 
up to a maximum of $30,000 to implement environmentally beneficial management practices 
identified in their EFP.  An econometric analysis on EFP relevant survey data was conducted to 
help identify the characteristics that influence participation in environmental management in the 
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 presence of economic incentives.  The EFP program was considered to be a suitable 
representative of an economic incentive-based program as 90% of those respondents from our 
survey who had conducted an EFP indicated that they did so to access funding.  This indicates 
that participation was largely based on financial incentives. 
 
For analysis of the survey responses it was assumed that farmers that maintain riparian areas 
surrounding wetland basins, including permanent wetlands, exhibit an intention to manage for 
environmental benefits of healthy wetland ecosystems.  Alternatively, farmers that plan to drain 
wetlands or remove trees and shrubs in the riparian zones and wetland basin do not exhibit a 
voluntary intention to manage for environmental goods and services.  Thus, the Logit models 
were expected to show that the same characteristics were significant in both wetland 
management models but with opposite coefficient signs.  The EFP model was run to determine if 
the same characteristics influence participation in environmental management when financial 
incentives are involved.  Each model used the same explanatory variables.  Continuous data 
variables included farmer age, farm size, land tenure (proportion owned) and land productivity.  
Categorical data variables included the opinion variable that the benefits of wetlands outweigh 
the disadvantages, education level, and tillage method.  Explanatory variables were chosen to 
represent demographic, regional, opinion and economic (e.g. land productivity) influences.  
However, the regional and land productivity variables were correlated and had a detrimental 
impact on our model results.  Thus, the models were ran separately with either the regional or 
productivity variable to determine which provided a better goodness-of-fit.  It was found that the 
productivity variable resulted in a better goodness-of-fit for all three econometric models, 




The underlying hypothesis to this econometric analysis was that the economic variable, namely 
land productivity would have the greatest influence on wetland management in the absence of 
financial incentives.  Since farmers are eligible for compensation for implementing beneficial 
management practices outlined by their EFP, it was expected that the productivity variable would 
not be a significant influence in the EFP model.  If this hypothesis holds true, the use of 
economic incentives to encourage participation in a wetland conservation program would be 
supported.   
 
3.3.3. Developing Incentive-Based Policy 
Provided that economic incentives are an effective way to proceed with a wetland conservation 
policy, it is essential to determine how to effectively meet ecological objectives.  Wetland and 
riparian restoration and (or) maintenance to achieve healthy wetland ecosystem functioning on 
the landscape is the main objective of the proposed wetland conservation policy.  Landscape 
function is defined as the net effect of all ecosystems on the landscape which includes synergistic 
effects.  The value of individual wetland depends on where they are in the landscape and how 
closely associated they are with other systems (Leibowitz et al. 2000, Mitsh and Gosselink 
2000).  The policy should also have a mandate of no-net loss of wetlands. 
 
Previous studies have shown that, in general, it is believed that farmers should be compensated 
for providing public goods (Claassen et al. 2001 and Weersink et al. 1998).  Incentive programs 
are viewed as being more flexible than regulatory regimes because they allow farmers to weigh 
the costs vs. the benefits before they choose to participate in the program.  In addition, farmers 
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 will choose the strategy that yields the most private benefits which inherently selects the most 
cost-effective farms to adopt the program.  However, the efficiency of the program is greatly 
influenced by the program design and the payment amount.  
 
A wetland conservation program that uses financial incentives seeks to offset the costs associated 
with restoring and maintaining wetland and riparian areas.   The theoretical financial incentive 
value that would be required for farmers to participate in wetland restoration and maintenance is 
based on a financial incentive value that offsets the private costs.  As discussed previously, the 
restoration of wetlands in this study is limited to the elimination of cultivation from wetland 
influenced areas.  Thus, for the purpose of this study, the private costs incurred are limited to the 
opportunity cost associated with foregone crop production.  The additional costs that could be 
incurred as a result of re-seeding perennial vegetation to reduce weedy species or hasten the 
restoration process can be fully or partially covered by existing government and non-government 
programs such as the Canada-Saskatchewan Farm Stewardship Program (CSFSP) or the 
Greencover Canada program and were not considered further in our analysis.  
 
An investigation of the potential for incentives in wetland conservation policy requires a realistic 
program timeframe.  Many past and existing conservation programs such as the U.S. 
Conservation Reserves Program (CRP) and Canada’s Greencover Program used a commitment 
period of 10 years.  To remain consistent with existing conservation programs, our research also 




 3.3.3.1. Spatial targeting of wetland and riparian restoration 
To meet social and environmental objectives it is assumed that some form of targeting will be 
required.  To determine the areas that a policy should target it is important to understand what is 
required for ecosystem functioning at both the landscape and local or individual scale.  At a 
landscape scale, Mitsch & Gosselink (2000) suggest that 3-7% of temperate regions should be 
dedicated to wetlands.  However, applying the precautionary principle we propose more stringent 
guidelines for our policy which would mandate that at least 10% of the landscape be composed 
of wetlands.  In this section we look at a number of scenarios for targeting wetland conservation 
programs that would result in wetlands comprising greater than 10% of the landscape and apply 
these scenarios to the case study farms.  For each scenario it would be required that all existing 
wetlands be maintained on the landscape to be eligible.  The feasibility of each scenario will be 
discussed in the results within a socio-economic and environmental context, looking at 
opportunity and restoration costs and the carbon sequestration benefits. The feasibility of using 
carbon markets in conjunction with conservation program payments will be investigated as 
policy instruments to offset private costs and encourage adoption of the wetland conservation 
program. 
 
Two aspects of spatial targeting were considered for a potential wetland conservation program.  
The first consideration was the class of wetland to be targeted.  In this case we looked at the 
option of targeting all classes of wetlands (seasonal and permanent) to reflect the true wetland 
influence on the landscape which would require re-establishing seasonal wetlands that have been 
under cultivation for several decades.  Another option was to target only existing permanent 
wetlands for riparian expansion and maintenance.   
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 The second consideration is the amount of area that should be allocated to riparian vegetation.  
There is not a general consensus among scientists regarding a standard riparian zone width 
required for healthy wetland functioning in the PPR.  However, a few examples in the literature 
indicate that a riparian buffer width of 10-30m is usually required for proper functioning 
depending on the size and class of wetland (Huel 2000, Rickerl et al. 2000, Phillips et al. 2005).  
In the present research the three program options considered for riparian width surrounding the 
wetland basin are as follows: 
1) Precision width riparian zone to reflect the true wetland influence on the landscape, 
as based on air photos, vegetation surveys and soil electrical conductivity.   
2) Fixed, 10 meter width riparian zone surrounding the wetland basin 
3) Fixed, 20 meter width riparian zone surrounding the wetland basin 
 
In total, six spatial targeting scenarios were investigated for each study site (Table 3.3).  
Digitized polygons were constructed in ArcGIS 9.1 for cropland, riparian grass, riparian tree and 
basin elements at each site (van den Bos 2005).  The area of the polygons were calculated and 
summed for each land use under each of the targeting scenarios described (Appendix A, Error! 
Reference source not found.).  The potential opportunity costs, carbon sequestration potential 
and incentive values were based on the calculated set-aside areas for all targeting scenarios. 
 
Table 3.3 Spatial targeting scenarios for the case study farms. 
 a. Precision riparian width 
b. Fixed riparian width 
- 10m 
c. Fixed riparian width 
- 20m 
1. Target all wetlands  
(seasonal & permanent) 
1. All wetlands 
a. Precision riparian  
1. All wetlands 
b. Fixed riparian - 10m 
1. All wetlands 
c. Fixed riparian - 20m 
2. Target permanent wetlands 2. Permanent wetlands a. Precision riparian  
2. Permanent wetlands 
b. Fixed riparian - 10m 
2. Permanent wetlands 




3.3.3.2. Private cost estimation 
The opportunity cost of wetland and riparian restoration was estimated based on two alternative 
indicators: 1) private lease rates and 2) the cost of forgone crop production.  The production 
values for the cultivated riparian elements at both MCI and SDNWA were calculated using: 1) 
variable production costs for the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones (SAF 2006c and SAFd); 2) 
the 10 year minimum, maximum and average yield for Canadian Western Red Spring wheat 
(CWRS) for the respective municipalities (SAF 2007a) and 3) the 10 year minimum, maximum 
and average Canadian Wheat Board on-farm price for CWRS wheat (SAF 2006b) (Table 3.4).   
 
Table 3.4 Estimated opportunity cost of retiring wetland-influenced areas (CAD).  













3AN Brown 49.4 86.45 61.75  -34.54 162.1 73.87 
8B Dark Brown 24.7 118.56 76.20  -120.04 218.38 117.23 
a SAF 2006a 
b Returns over variable expenses for CWRS wheat using: average yield data 1997-2006 SAF (2007), represents the 
cultivated riparian and basin elements in the field which are estimated to be 1.2 times greater than the mean yields 
in their respective regions (ACAAF 2007 unpublished data); Average price data 1997-2006 SAF (2006b); and 
2007 estimated expenses SAF (2006c) & SAF(2006d). 
 
Canadian Western Red Spring wheat was used in this study as it is the most commonly grown 
crop in Saskatchewan, accounting for an average of 30% of the total seeded area over the last 10 
years (SAF 2007b).  Due to the prevalence of CWRS wheat production in Saskatchewan it is 
often the focus of crop production studies in the literature.  As well, accurate data on CWRS 




 In the study area, previous research has shown that riparian areas that were converted to cropland 
are often the most productive areas on the field due to greater moisture availability, organic 
matter, N mineralization and favorable textural composition (Pennock et al. 1994, Jowkin and 
Schoenau 1998, Si and Farrell 2004).  Pennock et al. (2001) found that canola yields in the black 
soil zone were 1.47 times greater in the depressional elements than the field mean.  Jowkin and 
Schoenau (1998) found that spring wheat yields in footslope elements in the brown soil zone 
were 1.15 -1.29 times greater than the field mean.  Based on this research, in the current analysis 
yields for the cultivated riparian landform elements were estimated to be 1.2 times greater than 
the 10 year average yields reported for the respective rural municipalities based on ACAAF 
(2007) unpublished data.   
 
While it is recognized that there is a broad range of rental rates and production values, the 
production value of land was used in this study because it is often higher than the lease rates for 
a given region, which provides a more conservative benefit: cost estimate.  As well, when land is 
being leased it is likely that the entire field would be leased and the lease rates are reflective of 
the entire parcel of land.  Thus, the lease rate is not a true reflection of the value of the more 
productive cultivated riparian areas.  The average returns over variable expenses for CWRS 
wheat in cultivated riparian elements in the Brown soil zone is estimated to be $73.87 per ha and 
in the dark brown soil zone it is $117.23 per ha (Table 3.4). 
 
The minimum, maximum and average net revenues for CWRS wheat in each region were 
multiplied by the total area that would be restored to riparian vegetation under the different land 
allocation scenarios to give the total annual opportunity cost (Table B2).  To correspond to the 
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 proposed program commitment period, the present value opportunity cost for the 10 year period 
was calculated based on a 5% discount rate. 
 
3.3.3.3. Financial incentives 
Two alternative incentive methods investigated in this research are a carbon-based payment and 
a conservation program payment.  A carbon-based payment may be obtained through a free-
market carbon trading system, such as that which is represented in the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX).  A conservation program payment would be a publicly funded program that 
provides an area-based payment based on the total area dedicated to wetland and riparian areas, 
while carbon payments are based on the total amount of carbon sequestered per unit area as a 
result of implementing the beneficial management practices.  
 
The SOC sequestration potential of a given area is dependent on two overarching controls: 1) the 
initial SOC content prior to carbon sequestration practices and 2) the rate of C input with specific 
management practices under the prevailing environmental conditions (Janzen 1998, 
VandenBygaart et al. 2003 and Pennock 2005).  On the case study farms two management 
practices that will lead to SOC sequestration were considered: zero-till and riparian vegetation 
restoration.  In this study the SOC sequestration rates and the total amount of carbon that can be 
stored over a 10 year period were determined for the two case study farms for the cropped 
elements under zero-till and the riparian and basin landform elements with restored permanent 
vegetation.  The total amount of carbon that can be sequestered was converted to atmospheric 




 There is a general consensus that SOC sequestration by zero-till can be sustained for 20-50 years 
before a steady state is reached (Dumanski et al. 1998, Boehm et al. 2004, Desjardins et al. 
2005).  Both of the case study farms have employed zero-till for approximately 10 years so it 
was assumed that the cropped elements will continue to sequester carbon at a stable rate for at 
least another 10 years if no-till management is maintained.  Previous research has indicated that 
annual carbon sequestration rates of cropland under zero-till ranges from 0.08 to 0.20 Mg C ha-1 
yr-1 in the Brown soil zone and 0.14 to 0.37 Mg C ha-1 yr-1 in the Dark Brown soil zone (Boehm 
et al. 2004, Liang et al. 2005, McConkey et al. 2000, Smith et al. 2001, Vandenbygaart et al. 
2003).  The case study farms are considered to represent average farms in their respective soil 
zones so we would expect they would sequester carbon at their regional mean rates (Table 3.5).   
 
Table 3.5 Annual carbon sequestration co-efficients for cropped elements under zero till; and 
wetland basin and riparian elements with restored permanent vegetation. 
Region Basinab 
(Mg C ha-1 yr-1) 
Riparianac 
(Mg C ha-1 yr-1) 
Croplandd 
(Mg C ha-1 yr-1) 
Brown Soil Zone - MCI 0.80 0.77 0.12 
Dark Brown Soil Zone - SDNWA 1.07 1.03 0.23 
a Average annual SOC increase based on a 1% increase each year for 20 years (Pennock and Elliot 2007). 
b Depression elements and  
c Convergent footslope elements (Pennock et al. 1994). 
d Regional mean carbon sequestration rate for cropland under zero-till (Boehm et al. 2004, Liang et al. 2005, 
McConkey et al. 2000, Smith et al. 2001, Vandenbygaart et al. 2003) 
 
Few studies in the literature investigated the potential of pothole wetlands and riparian areas to 
sequester carbon when permanent vegetation is restored.  Bridgham et al. (2006) estimated that 
carbon could be sequestered in restored prairie wetland soils at rates ranging from 0.17-1.85 Mg 
ha-1 yr-1 but these estimates were presented with a very high level of uncertainty.  Euliss et al. 
(2006) found that restored wetland soils can sequester up to 3.05 Mg C ha-1 yr-1.  For the 
purposes of this study the restored wetland and riparian carbon sequestration co-efficients were 
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 based on the estimates presented by Pennock and Elliot (2007) for the SDNWA.  They found 
that when cropland was restored to permanent cover SOC could be sequestered at an average rate 
of 1% per year over a 20 year period.  Based on the initial SOC estimates (Table 3.1), the SOC 
sequestration rates for wetland and basin areas were calculated at a 1% annual gain (Table 3.5).  
It is assumed that existing riparian and basin areas are currently at a steady state so no additional 
C is sequestered by maintaining these areas 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Farmer Characteristics 
The decision to participate in environmentally beneficial management practices is not based on 
economic factors alone.  Demographic factors as well as opinions and attitudes can affect the 
adoption of a wetland conservation practices (Gelso et al. 2008). The results of the wetland 
management and environmental farm plan Logit models are presented in Table 3.6.  The riparian 
maintenance model suggests that with increasing land productivity, farmers are less likely to 
maintain riparian zones surrounding wetland basins.  As was expected, in the wetland drainage 
model, the coefficient for land productivity is also significant (P<0.05) but positive.  In other 
words, those with more productive land are more likely to drain wetlands or push bush.  This is 
not surprising given that productivity is directly related to profitability (i.e. opportunity cost).   
 
Farmers’ opinions regarding wetlands also influence their willingness to maintain riparian areas 
(Table 3.6).  Farmers who agreed that the benefits of wetlands outweigh the disadvantages were 
twice as likely to maintain riparian areas around at least their permanent wetlands (the same is 
not true for seasonal wetlands).  However, the co-efficient for this opinion variable was also 
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 significant (P<0.05) and positive in the wetland drainage model which is contrary to what we 
expected.  This indicates that farmers who plan to drain wetlands or remove bush from their land 
also think that the benefits of wetlands outweigh disadvantages.  Perhaps when farmers 
responded to this opinion question they recognized the social benefits of wetlands but despite 
this they consider the private cost of maintaining wetlands and natural areas too high.  This 
survey result may also be influenced by the fact that the survey was conducted in a flood year for 
CAR 8B, therefore their responses to draining may have been a result of their frustration.  It is 
possible that if the study had been conducted in a dry year the results may have differed but there 
is no way of supporting this postulate with the existing data.  
 
Tillage method was also found to be significant (P<0.05) in the wetland drainage model.  Those 
who practice conservation tillage or zero-till, both considered to be environmental management 
practices by reducing erosion and improving soil health, were less likely to drain wetlands or 
push bush. 
 
In contrast to wetland management practices, participation in the EFP program is significantly 
influenced by demographic variables such as age and farm area (P<0.01).  Alternatively, the 
wetland opinion (benefits>disadvantages) and land productivity variables had no significant 
predictive value for farmers who conducted EFPs while these variables were highly significant in 
predicting farmers’ wetland management practices.  This is an important finding as it indicates 
that financial incentives are effective in encouraging farmers to participate in environmental 
management.  The effect of opinions and land productivity variables in predicting 
environmentally beneficial management practices diminished because compensation is provided. 
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 Table 3.6 Influences on wetland management and participation in the Environmental Farm Plan 
Program using a Logit binary response model. 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Maintain Riparian Around 
Permanent Wetlands   






















1.61 0.21  -3.95** 1.22 -3.24  1.05 1.85 0.57 
Age 0.02 0.01 1.11  -0.01 0.01 -0.55  -0.04** 0.02 -2.51 
Education 0.10 0.17 0.56  0.20 0.12 1.61  0.19 0.20 0.94 
Total Farm 
Area 
0.00 0.00 1.30  0.00 0.00 0.98  0.01** 0.00 2.74 
Proportion 
Owned 
0.00 0.01 0.25  -0.00 0.00 -0.48  -0.01 0.01 -1.63 
Land 
Productivity 
-0.07* 0.04 -1.99  0.06* 0.03 2.25  -0.01 0.04 -0.15 
Tillage 0.26 0.22 1.18  -0.45* 0.19 -2.37  0.62* 0.27 2.32 
Benefits of 
Wetlands > 




0.68** 0.25 2.72  0.48* 0.20 2.41  0.43 0.27 1.47 
            
No. of 
observations 
182  170  185 
Log likelihood -11571  -70.39  -89.56 
Likelihood 
ratio χ2 (df) 
17.71**(7)  37.36**(7)  58.21**(7) 
McFadden R2 0.07   0.21   0.25 
a Huber/White robust standard error 
**indicates significance level where P<0.01, * indicates significance level where P<0.05 
 
The EFP model shows that respondents with larger farms were more likely to conduct an EFP.  
Larger farms tend to be run more like a traditional business model with the farm managers 
dedicating more time to taking care of the business aspects of the farm operation such as finances 
and planning and less time doing labour (Claassen et al. 2001).  Thus, it is not surprising that 
they are more likely to have the taken the time required to conduct an EFP.  This is further 
supported by the fact that of those survey respondents who had not conducted a farm plan, 42% 




The EFP model suggests that older farmers are less likely to conduct an EFP.  This may be due 
to the complexity of these programs.  For example, 30% of farmers indicated that they had not 
conducted an EFP because there was too much paper work.  Also, a relatively large percentage 
(30%) of farmers had not conducted an EFP because they had never heard of the program.  Many 
aging farmers have limited knowledge of computers and internet which has arguably become the 
most often used mode of communication.  Perhaps information about these programs is not 
reaching the entire target audience because they do not have access to computer related media; 
further research is needed to investigate this postulate. 
 
The EFP model also indicates that farms that already practice some form of conservation tillage 
are more likely to conduct an EFP. This highlights that those who have already exhibited an 
intention to manage for the environment are more likely to participate in a program with an 
environmental focus. 
 
3.4.2. Effectiveness of Incentive-Based Policy Tools  
Each of the spatial targeting scenarios was evaluated in terms of carbon sequestration potential 
and mean opportunity cost of production over a 10 year period based on the total area restored to 
wetland vegetation.  Based on the GIS analysis the area dedicated to restored wetland vegetation 
ranges from 0.1 to 5.2 hectares at MCI and 0.0 to 7.1 hectares at SDNWA (Appendix B).  With 
each case study site occupying approximately 1 quarter section of land (~65 ha), less than 10% 
of the total field would be dedicated to restored riparian vegetation for any of the targeting 
93 
 
 scenarios.  Yet, restored and existing wetland influenced areas combined can occupy up to 23% 
and 43% of the landscape at MCI and SDNWA, respectively.   
 
The estimated total carbon that can be sequestered over a 10 year program period ranges from 66 
to 100 Mg C (242-365 t CO2) at MCI and from 104 to 161 Mg C (380-589 t CO2)  at SDNWA 
(Table 3.7).  It is important to note that the predicted increases in soil carbon above initial carbon 
stores were relatively small.  This warrants some discussion.  First, despite the land being 
cultivated there were still relatively large stores of SOC prior to management changes which 
sequester carbon thereby making small changes in carbon difficult to detect.  Furthermore, this 
study only looks at a 10 year horizon which is insufficient time for the soil to reach its full 
carbon carrying capacity.   
 
Table 3.7 Total soil organic carbon sequestered and atmospheric CO2 equivalents over 10 years 
under different management scenarios. 















 (Mg) (t CO2) (%)  (Mg) (t CO2) (%) 
No Change 66.1 242.0 1.6  103.8 379.9 1.5 
All wetland  
Precision riparian (1a) 80.6 294.8 2.0  130.7 478.3 1.9 
All wetlands  
Riparian-10m (1b) 77.0 281.7 1.9  121.6 444.9 1.8 
All wetlands  
Riparian- 20m (1c) 99.7 365.0 2.4  160.9 588.7 2.4 
Permanent wetlands 
Precision riparian (2a) 71.2 260.4 1.7  103.8 380.0 1.5 
Permanent wetlands 
Riparian - 10m (2b) 67.0 245.1 1.6  103.8 379.9 1.5 
Permanent wetlands 
Riparian - 20m (2c) 77.0 281.7 1.9  106.2 388.8 1.6 




 It is also important to put the carbon sequestration potential of a single agricultural field into a 
social perspective. It is estimated that Canada emits 550.9 million t CO2 from fuel combustion 
annually which is 17.24 t CO2 per capita (OECD 2006).  This indicates that, at the MCI study 
site, the C sequestered by the different scenarios can offset fuel combustion emissions of 0.4-0.6 
individuals per year and at SDNWA 0.6-1.0 individuals per year.  So in terms of carbon 
sequestration benefits there is really no practical difference between any of the scenarios. 
 
The total carbon that is predicted to be sequestered by the various landscape elements over a 10 
year period is shown in Figure 3.2b.  Over 60% of carbon sequestered under all management 
scenarios would be due to the influence of zero-till on the cropped areas.  However, the wetland 
influenced areas have a disproportionate effect on carbon storage relative to the total area that 
they occupy.  Although restored wetland areas occupy a relatively small proportion on the 
landscape, they still make important contributions to the overall field carbon budget.  For 
example under scenario 1C (all wetlands targeted with a minimum 20m riparian width) the 
restored wetland areas occupy only 10% of the landscape but account for 46% of the carbon 
sequestered.  Figure 3.2 also highlights that the management scenarios with the greatest carbon 
benefits are also associated with the greatest costs.  This comes as no surprise as the scenarios 
that have the greatest carbon benefits require that a greater amount of land be removed from 
















































































Figure 3.2 Land use allocation (a), total soil organic carbon sequestered (b) and present value 
opportunity cost (discount rate (r) =5%) (c) over a 10 year period for different 
management scenarios at MCI & SDNWA. 
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 Considering the alternative targeting scenarios, the precision riparian width would be optimal in 
terms of environmental benefits because precision riparian width reflects the true extent of 
wetlands.  Restoring wetlands to their true extent on the landscape would have a greater 
probability of providing healthy, functioning wetland ecosystems.  The administration costs of 
implementing a program that requires the provision of precision riparian zones on a landscape 
would likely be significant due to the requirement for extensive expertise and field data (i.e. soil 
electrical conductivity, vegetation surveys, digital elevation models and multiple aerial images) 
to delineate these areas accurately.  In contrast, limited expertise and field data are necessary to 
delineate a fixed riparian width so transaction costs are greatly reduced and fixed riparian width 
is more user friendly, thus more likely to be adopted. 
 
For the two case study farms, there is no obvious environmental advantage to develop a policy 
that targets only permanent wetlands with a 10m riparian width.  At the other extreme, providing 
a 20-m riparian buffer around all wetlands provides maximum environmental benefits but is 
highly costly since the riparian area often extends into the surrounding uplands and as such has a 
greater impact on cropland management (Figure 3.2 and Appendix B).  
 
At MCI the mean opportunity costs and carbon benefits for the scenario that targets permanent 
wetlands with a 20 m riparian width and the scenario that targets all wetlands with a 10 m width 
are roughly equivalent.  However, at SDNWA the opportunity cost and carbon benefits of 
providing a 20m riparian zone around existing wetlands is considerably less than providing a 
10m riparian zone around all wetlands (Figure 3.2).  This is because SDNWA already has 20m 
riparian zones for the majority of permanent wetlands so there are essentially no additional costs 
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 to maintaining these areas but there are also no carbon sequestration benefits.  The difference 
between the two sites could be due to different management goals. The SDNWA is managed as 
a wildlife area so riparian areas have been provided to maximize wildlife habitat.  The only 
potential for improving carbon sequestration in riparian areas at SDNWA is for seasonal 
wetlands (mostly Stewart and Kantrud (1971) class 1 and 2) to be fully restored.  Alternatively, 
MCI is privately owned and managed for crop production so the goal has been profit 
maximization not environmental benefits.  Alternatively, the difference between the two farms 
could be a regional difference in that farmers in the aspen parkland are forced to provide wider 
riparian zones due to woody vegetation growth that deters cultivation in these areas.  
  
An effective compensation amount for farmers to adopt a wetland conservation program was 
considered using a benefit/cost ratio.  A ratio greater than 1 indicates that the program payments 
exceed the mean opportunity costs and farmers should accept the program.  The results of the 
benefit-cost analysis and the proposed program payment amount can be seen in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8 Estimated payments (CAD) required to offset opportunity cost from a wetland 
conservation program alone and interplaying with the carbon market.  
Study 
Region 
Conservation Program Payment 
Alone 
  Conservation Program Payment in Conjunction with 
Carbon Marketb 
$ ha-1 yr-1 Total Program Paymenta 
$ yr-1 




3AN 75.00 4,008,750  60.90 3,255,105 18 
8B 95.00 7,876,488  76.15 6,313,626 20 
a The total payment that would be expected to come from the publicly funded program if 10% of the total cropland 
area in 3AN & 8B was dedicated to wetland and riparian areas. 
bEstimated carbon contract value at $5.00 CAD t-1 CO2 yr-1 based on CCX trends. 





 Carbon contracts on the CCX ranged from $1.00 to $5.00 CAD t-1 CO2 yr
-1 in 2007 and early 
2008 which is considerably less than what is needed to cover the mean opportunity cost of 
production.  Likewise, the publicly funded conservation program payments that would be 
required to offset private opportunity costs are quite high on their own.  However, if the two 
incentives are employed simultaneously, the carbon market can help to reduce the total 
conservation program payment amount.  Based on market trends it is not unreasonable to think 
that sequestered carbon can be traded for $5.00 CAD t-1 CO2, by factoring this into a wetland 
conservation program, payments can be reduced by up to 20% (Table 3.8). 
 
3.5. Discussion 
The decision to participate in an environmental program is influenced by a combination of 
monetary incentives as well as personal beliefs and attitudes.  The results of our survey indicate 
that a majority of the respondents are interested in the environment but the opinions and 
behaviours of farmers may be in contrast if the private costs are too high.  For example, even 
though many farmers believe that wetlands provide important social benefits they are unwilling 
to provide them on their fields.  It was also found that farmers with more productive land are less 
likely to manage for wetland conservation.  Ultimately, the decision to provide wetlands on the 
landscape comes down to economic factors. Farm incomes are volatile, forcing many farmers to 
manage based on economics alone.  Providing financial incentives allows farmers to choose to 
manage for environmental goods and services while maintaining farm income.  Our results also 
highlight the importance of the financial incentive value; the opportunity cost to farmers varies 




 The costs and benefits of the different targeting scenarios for a wetland restoration program are 
based on the total area restored to riparian vegetation so it should come as no surprise that the 
programs that yield the greatest carbon benefits also represent the greatest opportunity cost.   
However, this does not take into account the transaction costs of the different targeting 
strategies.   
 
It is apparent that spatial targeting scenarios involving precision riparian widths optimize 
environmental benefits but represent large transaction costs in terms of technical expertise and 
inconvenience to farmers, as reported by Dosskey et al. (2005).  Alternatively, implementing a 
scenario that targets only permanent wetlands with a 10 m riparian zone represents a least cost 
method but there are also minimal environmental benefits.  The scenario that targets all wetlands 
with a 20 m riparian width yields the most carbon sequestration benefits but it is also represents 
the greatest opportunity cost and is probably the least likely to be adopted by farmers as a result 
of inconvenience. 
 
The ecological benefits of restoring seasonal wetlands on the landscape must be included in the 
evaluation of wetland conservation policy.  There is a potential for more carbon to be 
sequestered and the biological diversity gained from restoring these areas would be greater than 
simply expanding existing riparian areas.  However, unless the entire field is restored to 
permanent vegetation there is a very low likelihood that farmers would adopt a policy mandating 
seasonal wetlands to be restored on the landscape due to greater inconvenience costs.  Gelso et 
al. (2008) found that greater wetland dispersion across the landscape represents larger 
inconvenience costs; thus, farmers are unlikely to support programs that require a high level of 
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 wetland dispersion across the landscape.  By simply examining the delineated images in 
Appendix A, the inconvenience to avoid seasonal wetland areas would be immense for 
producers, particularly in the Aspen Parkland. 
 
A wetland conservation program that spatially targets existing wetlands and requires at least a 
20m riparian zone would be relatively inexpensive to implement and would be appealing to 
farmers.  Although it is unlikely that an efficient wetland policy can be developed that satisfies 
all environmental and economic criteria but based on the analysis here, this policy does represent 
a pareto improvement (i.e. the winners win more than the losers lose).   
 
It may seem like environmental benefits are sacrificed by developing a wetland policy that is 
more suited to agricultural systems.  However, one must consider that the benefits gained on a 
landscape scale are far greater if more farmers participate.  In addition, concerns have been 
raised as to the effect of climate change on seasonal wetlands (Johnson et al. 2005).  Climate 
models predict a warmer and drier climate in much of the PPR.  Many seasonal wetlands are 
predicted to dry up entirely, diminishing their ability to provide environmental benefits.  This 
further supports targeting permanent wetlands for conservation efforts to achieve long-term 
benefits. 
 
Although on its own carbon sequestration on agricultural landscapes makes very modest 
contributions to climate change mitigation, effective mitigation strategies are based on many 
modest reduction by various means that are economically efficient (Hutchinson et al. 2007).  The 
wetland management strategies imposed on each of these study sites will have a negligible 
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 regional, let alone global, effect on their own.  Furthermore, to enrol in a carbon market such as 
the CCX the minimum project size is 10,000 t CO2 annually.  Thus, no individual farmer will 
have the capabilities to trade under the CCX alone but must work with a carbon, such as existing 
farmer organizations, governments or environmental groups like the Soil Conservation Council 
of Saskatchewan (SCCS).  For a carbon aggregator to be successful it is even more important to 
develop a policy that is easily implemented and will be widely adopted.  
 
Although this study only looks at a 10 year time period it is important to consider long term 
implications as well.  Even when zero-till is employed, a new steady state will likely be reached 
on cropped elements within 20 years and this new equilibrium will occur at a SOC level below 
the maximum potential for that particular field (Boehm et al. 2004, Desjardins et al. 2005, 
Dumanski et al. 1998).  Alternatively, the wetland influenced areas will continue to sequester 
carbon for several decades and, if left undisturbed, should eventually reach the maximum SOC 
potential for that particular soil.  This study also does not investigate the potential of carbon 
sequestration in above-ground biomass.  Slobodian et al. (2002) found that the greatest carbon 
gains in wetland and riparian areas were actually in the biomass, particularly when woody 
species were present. 
 
The annual program payments required to offset the opportunity cost of foregone crop 
production range from $75 per hectare in the Brown soil zone to $95 per hectare in the Dark 
Brown soil zone.  However, if a wetland policy utilizes the carbon market publicly funded 




 There are two ways to accomplish co-benefits from the carbon market and a wetland 
conservation program, easing the strain on the public purse. One option is for farmers to 
participate in a carbon market independent of the conservation program, the second option is for 
the conservation program to act as the aggregator and sell carbon on the market on the farmers’ 
behalf (Feng and Kling 2005).  The discussion of which option is optimal is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
3.6. Conclusions  
This study examined the use of financial incentive-based policy to conserve wetlands on a prairie 
agricultural landscape by compensating farmers for foregone crop production in wetland and 
riparian areas. A policy that targets the existing wetlands on the landscape for enhancement 
(riparian zones must be at least 20 m wide) and maintenance provides moderate social benefits 
and private costs which can be offset by program payments.  Utilizing an existing carbon market 
in conjunction with a conservation program payment provides environmental co-benefits and can 
help reduce the publicly funded program payments by 20%. 
 
A note of caution must be exercised when using incentives.  It is possible that farmers have been 
targeted with providing public goods so many times that their willingness to contribute 
voluntarily is diminishing (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Reeson and Tisdell 2006).  
Sometimes it is necessary to understand what level of environmental benefits farmers can 
reasonably be expected to provide to society without compensation.  It may be useful to carry out 
a valuation study asking farmers about their willingness to accept value for providing wetlands 
on their fields.  Differences between actual WTA and mean opportunity cost of production may 
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 capture farmer’s inherent value in wetlands.  This difference should be factored into the program 
payment amount.  It would also be useful to investigate society’s environmental rights within a 
legislative framework to determine if regulation of wetland management on agricultural 
landscapes is justified.  Of course, such research would also have to address the cost of verifying 




 4.0 SYNTHESIS, CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study, land use allocation and management of wetlands in the PPR were investigated.  The 
empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 3 investigated factors that may influence how farmers 
manage wetlands in the PPR.  Factors that may influence participation in an incentive based 
program such as the Environmental Farm Plan were also investigated.  Land productivity was 
found to be the most important factor in predicting voluntary farmer participation in wetland 
conservation practices while opinions were also significant.  However, participation in the 
Environmental Farm Plan program is influenced by demographic factors such as age and farm 
size while opinions were not significant.  This indicates that financial incentives may encourage 
farmers to participate in wetland conservation practices that otherwise would not.  Older farmers 
may be less likely to participate in environmental-based programs because they may be more 
resistant to change and to government intervention.  As well, older farmers may be less inclined 
to use new technologies that are required to apply and implement environmental programs.  
Larger farms may be more likely to conduct an EFP because they dedicate more time to business 
management, thus enabling them to enrol in government-funded programs (Lambert et al. 2006).  
While these are believed to be reasonable explanations for the models provided, further research 
is needed to verify these explanations.   
 
The survey results in Chapter 3 indicate that 90% of survey respondents participated in the 
Environmental Farm Plan Program to access funding showing that incentives are largely 
responsible for participation in the EFP.  Thus, the EFP program was used as an example of an 
economic incentive program in our econometric analysis although in reality it facilitates the flow 
of incentives while other programs actually provide the funding to farmers.  It is also important 
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 to note that although the EFP was used an example of an environmental-based incentive 
program, there is no evidence that the same variables would be significant predictors of a 
wetland conservation program.  Thus, future farm survey research may be needed on a 
hypothetical wetland conservation program to determine if the same results hold true.  It should 
also be noted that the wetland management and environmental farm plan econometric models 
had relatively poor goodness of fit.  Therefore, it is highly recommended that further research be 
conducted to validate these findings.  
 
The research in Chapter 3 also investigated the carbon sequestration potential and private costs 
for different spatial targeting scenarios to determine the strategy that yielded the highest level of 
carbon benefits relative to costs.  At both study sites, a policy that targets permanent and existing 
wetlands with a minimum riparian 20m buffer would yield the greatest carbon sequestration 
benefits relative to costs and would likely be adopted by farmers.  
 
Wetland areas have the potential to represent a net carbon sink on the landscape.  However, 
wetland influenced areas often represent the most productive areas on the landscape as well.  
Thus, there are likely more cost-effective ways to sequester carbon, from a producer perspective, 
such as converting from conventional tillage to zero-till or converting entire agricultural fields to 
permanent cover.  For this reason, a wetland conservation program should not focus on carbon 
sequestration as the primary objective.  However, a well defined wetland conservation program 
that requires restoration and maintenance of riparian areas may result in carbon sequestration as a 
co-benefit.  Thus, the carbon that is sequestered as a co-benefit to wetland conservation can be 
traded on the carbon market to reduce the wetland conservation program cost.  The research 
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 presented in this study indicates that the publicly funded portion of wetland conservation 
program payments can be reduced by up to 20% when there is interplay with private carbon 
markets.   
 
One aspect of public wetland conservation program and carbon market interaction that was not 
discussed was the transaction costs associated with this interaction.  If the wetland conservation 
program acts as the carbon aggregator the transaction costs are incurred by the governing body 
(i.e. taxpayers).  Alternatively, if farmers are free to trade their own carbon the transaction costs 
are incurred privately.  Furthermore, there is currently no existing carbon aggregator that 
recognizes carbon sequestered in restored wetland and riparian areas specifically.  Therefore, 
perhaps it is the responsibility of the government to act as the carbon aggregator through a 
proposed wetland conservation program.  More research is needed into the role of carbon 
aggregators for carbon sequestered in restored wetlands and riparian areas and the potential for 
wetland restoration practices to be recognized by carbon markets. 
 
An effective wetland conservation policy in the PPR will likely require a range of policy tools to 
meet environmental objectives.  The empirical analysis of this study focused primarily on 
economic incentives.  Rather than strict regulation of wetland management, economic incentives 
are viewed as being more equitable and effective in ensuring the protection of wetland benefits 
for society (Lant 1994). In an agricultural context incentive-based conservation programs may be 
a suitable replacement for programs that provide subsidies based on crop acreage and yield.  As a 
result of shifting the program subsidies away from crop production to production of 
environmental goods the public is subsidizing a public good, rather than just subsidizing farm 
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 income with no public return (Lant et al. 2005).  This solution could meet the pareto 
improvement criterion; namely, those who benefit from wetland preservation would compensate 
those incurring costs to maintain public benefits.  In addition, it is important for subsidy 
programs to include the maintenance of existing wetlands as these are the most valuable systems 
because they are already functioning and providing a high level of ecological goods and services.  
It can take restored wetlands up to 50 years to achieve a level of functioning comparable to 
native wetlands (Gutrich and Hitzhusen 2004, Lovell and Sullivan 2006).   
 
It is of utmost importance to determine an effective compensation amount to ensure that the 
program is readily adopted by farmers.  A reasonable compensation amount in this study was 
assumed to be the opportunity cost of production, that is, the income that farmers would forego 
to provide wetland and riparian areas.  However, this compensation amount ignores two 
important cost considerations; these costs include nuisance or inconvenience costs and 
transaction costs. 
 
Inconvenience costs refer to the inconvenience of manoeuvring around obstacles in the field, 
such as wetlands, with farm equipment.  As farm equipment continues to grow in size and 
power, inconvenience costs of avoiding isolated wetlands increase (Huel 2000).  In addition, 
many prairie farmers have adopted GPS technology to operate their field equipment.  With the 
use of GPS units the operator only has to manually steer when there are obstacles to manoeuvre 
around such as fence-lines and wetlands.  Thus, with increasing numbers and dispersal of 
wetlands on the field inconvenience costs can be expected to increase greatly (Gelso et al. 2008).  
Future research into the value of nuisance costs can help to refine the compensation amount as 
108 
 
 well as give policy makers and society a more realistic value of the costs associated with wetland 
and riparian conservation in agricultural landscapes.    
 
The second cost that was largely ignored in this study was transaction costs imposed during the 
implementation of the wetland conservation program.  Transaction costs are incurred by both the 
individual participating in the program and the governing body.  Transaction costs incurred by 
private participants include the application process and implementation of the program measures.  
The cost of application is often over-looked and many government programs fail to recognize 
that the amount of paper work involved in the application process is prohibitive.  In fact, the 
application process and the volume of documentation required is one of the most common 
complaints with current government subsidy programs such as the Canadian Agriculture Income 
Stabilization Program and Environmental Farm Plans in conjunction with the National Farm 
Stewardship Program.  For example, in our survey 30% of respondents that had not completed an 
EFP claimed that there was too much paper work and 42% said that they didn’t have enough 
time.  Minimizing the amount of paper work required to apply for conservation programs and 
providing technical assistance to implementation can reduce these private transaction costs.  
Future research is needed to clarify the extent of private transaction costs and their influence on 
conservation program adoption.     
 
The public transaction costs associated with environmental incentive programs such as those 
examined in this research include program development and implementation, compliance 
verification and enforcement.  However, these costs would be associated with any government 
conservation program whether it used regulation, cross-compliance or financial incentives.  
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 Ideally, enforcement costs would be lower for economic incentive programs than for regulatory 
programs as participation is voluntary and farmers are compensated to comply, but this should 
not be taken for granted.  In chapter 3 it was noted that those targeting scenarios requiring 
precision conservation techniques would be associated with greater transaction costs due to the 
amount of technical equipment and expertise required and difficulties with compliance 
verification (Khannaa et al. 2003, Dosskey et al. 2005).  However, the magnitude of these costs 
was unknown.  It should be noted that technological innovations such as satellite imagery can 
decrease monitoring and enforcement costs.  Further research would be needed to measure and 
define these transaction costs to better inform policy makers.   
 
Although it was assumed that the compensation amount required for farmers to participate in 
wetland restoration and maintenance is equal to the mean private costs that are incurred, it is 
possible that the compensation amount could be less and farmers would still adopt the program 
especially if farmers find an inherent value in wetlands and riparian areas (Amigues 2002).  In 
addition, program payments represent stable income which may be attractive when compared to 
highly volatile commodity markets.  Thus, perhaps it is preferable to estimate the compensation 
amount through a process that can capture those benefits and costs not captured by mean 
opportunity of production.  For example a survey instrument using contingent valuation, where 
farmers are asked their willingness to accept value, may be appropriate.  If a lower program 
payment value can be offered to farmers than the mean opportunity cost value and still be largely 
accepted by the farm population the cost to the program can be reduced considerably.  Therefore, 
although contingent valuation methods can be quite costly, this can be justified if the willingness 




When economic incentives are the only policy tool used to meet objectives the program can 
become costly.  In addition, the use of economic incentives alone diminishes the inherent 
responsibilities of landowners to provide a socially acceptable level of ecological goods and 
services (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Reeson and Tisdell 2006).  An alternative to a strictly 
economic incentive program involves the use of some form of cross-compliance.  Cross-
compliance often incorporates a combination of regulation and economic incentive that may be 
more cost-effective than economic incentives alone.  In addition, cross-compliance programs can 
regulate farmers to provide environmental benefits that are felt by society to be the responsibility 
of the farmers.  For example, in the U.S. swampbuster program, to achieve a mandate of no-net 
loss of wetlands, support benefits from all government funded farm programs are denied to 
farmers who plant crops in wetland areas or who drained or altered wetlands after 1985 (EPA 
2008).  While this study did not provide an in-depth investigation of cross-compliance programs 
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 APPENDIX A – RELEVANT LEGISLATION, POLICIES AND TREATIES 
Saskatchewan Legislation: 
Saskatchewan Wetland Policy (1995) 
Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, 2005 
Saskatchewan Drainage Control Regulations (2006) 
The Conservation Easements Act (1996) 
The Environmental Assessment Act (1980) 
The Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002 
The Ecological Reserves Act (1980) 
The Natural Resources Act, 1993 
The Wildlife Act, 1998 
The Wildlife Habitat Protection Act (1984) 
 
 
Canadian Policies & Legislation: 
Agriculture Policy Framework (2003) 
The Constitution Act, 1867 (The British North America Act, 1867) 
The Constitution Act, 1982 
Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992) 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 
Canada Oceans Act (1996) 
Canada Wildlife Act (1985) 
The Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (1991) 
Fisheries Act (1985) 
Income Tax Act of Canada (1985) 
Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 
National Parks Act (2000) 
Northwest Irrigation Act (1894) 
Species at Risk Act (2003) 
 
International Treaties 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1981) 
North American Waterfowl Management Plan (1986) 









Figure B1 MCI management scenarios when all wetlands targeted. 
 
  











Figure B4 SDNWA management scenarios when permanent wetlands targeted. 
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 Table B1 Total area (ha) in cropland, wetland basin and riparian areas and the carbon 
sequestered under different management scenarios over a 10 year period. 

















4.5 5.2 55.1 0.0 
 
7.8 13.3 45.1 0.0 
No Change 
4.9 7.0 52.9 2.2 
 
8.1 16.4 41.8 3.3 
All wetland Precision 
riparian (1a) 
4.9 6.4 53.4 1.7 
 
8.1 15.3 42.9 2.2 
All wetlands Riparian-
10m (1b) 
4.9 9.9 49.9 5.2 
 
8.1 20.2 38.0 7.1 
All wetlands Riparian- 
20m (1c) 
4.5 5.9 54.3 0.8 
 
7.8 13.4 45.1 0.0 
Permanent wetlands 
Precision riparian (2a) 
4.5 5.3 55.0 0.1 
 
7.8 13.3 45.1 0.0 
Permanent wetlands 
Riparian - 10m (2b) 
4.5 6.8 53.4 1.7 
 
7.8 13.6 44.8 0.3 
Permanent wetlands 




 Table B2 Present value opportunity cost of minimum, maximum and mean production over a 
10 year period on restored riparian areas (discount rate (r) = 5%).   
Management Scenario MCI  SDNWA 
Minimum Maximum Mean  Minimum Maximum Mean  
   ($)    ($)  
No Change 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
All wetland Precision 
riparian (1a) -587.57 2757.52 1256.62  -3101.84 5642.98 3029.32 
All wetlands Riparian-
10m (1b) -440.66 2068.08 942.44  -2044.32 3719.09 1996.52 
All wetlands Riparian- 
20m (1c) -1373.92 6447.96 2938.38  -6596.92 12001.35 6442.68 
Permanent wetlands 
Precision riparian (2a) -206.47 969.01 441.58  -11.87 21.60 11.59 
Permanent wetlands 
Riparian - 10m (2b) -35.08 164.66 75.04  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Permanent wetlands 










 APPENDIX D - SURVEY 
 






















Figure D4 Survey reminder post card. 
